“Our sense of Ethiopian identity is strong, perhaps stronger than that of some within the Federation. Yet, despite this nationalism, we have long been neglected. The situation has worsened since November 2020,” says a resident of Irob Woreda, Tigray. “The area is under Eritrean occupation. Our children have been forced to enrol in the Eritrean education system for a considerable time. We are given a ‘take it or leave it’ ultimatum,” the resident told The Reporter Magazine.
“South Sudanese militants infiltrate our territory for mining and repeatedly kill our people. These ongoing killings have decimated one clan to just 50-60 survivors. When will the federal government deploy the military to this border?” an MP representing constituents from the Ethiopian community bordering South Sudan said to the Foreign Relations and Peace Affairs Committee two years ago.
“General Burhan’s army has taken control of thousands of hectares of our farmlands in the aftermath of the outbreak of the northern war,” says a farmer who used to own a large farm in Metemma district, particularly in the area known as ‘Delelo’ by Ethiopians.
During Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s (PhD) tenure, which marked its seventh anniversary this month, such voices of frustration have echoed from all corners of Ethiopia, one of the world’s oldest states currently encompassing over 1.1 million square kilometers and bordering seven nations (two of which are less than four decades old, and one which is not yet formally recognized by the United Nations).
The often-shaky relations with neighboring countries came up during the Prime Minister’s recent address to Parliament, where he stated that Ethiopia is actively avoiding conflict “not because there aren’t causes for war with neighbors. But [because] we prefer not to.”
Sovereignty Paradox: When Perception Clashes with Technical Reality
A fundamental principle of international law, sovereignty—the authority of a state to govern its territory—has historically been a powerful unifying force in Ethiopia. It has compelled Ethiopians, despite their conflicting or unclear views on broader national matters, to unite and sacrifice for their nation.
On the other hand, experts draw attention to a fact that challenges the deeply held beliefs among many Ethiopians about their country’s territorial integrity—beliefs for which many have historically gone to war. These specialists argue that this old state has yet to complete the task of defining its borders with its neighbors, a situation that could result in more conflicts if not addressed.
Belete Belachew (PhD), a foreign policy analyst and researcher on diplomatic history, points out that Ethiopia has only formally demarcated 12.5 percent of its borders despite the relatively extensive network of shared borders with its neighbors.
According to the most recent ‘Global Fire Power’ report that considered 145 nations, Ethiopia ranks 25th in total shared border length, with nearly 6,000 km (5,925 km). It is worth noting that precise figures vary between sources.
In his book, ‘Ye Ethiopia Dar Dinber: Yaltequache Yebet Sira’ (loosely translated as ‘Ethiopia’s Boundary: An Unfinished Business’), Belete presents the figure as 5,620 kilometers.
The ‘Northern War’ initiated in November 2020 between the TPLF and the federal government served as a stark reminder of the volatile nature of the nation’s border disputes. The border with Sudan is worth-mentioning in this regard.
Ethio-Sudan Border: Long-Running Dispute, Legacy of Poor Demarcation
The term ‘Alfashga’ is widely known, particularly in international media, as the Sudanese name for the disputed area they claim. However, local Ethiopians with their own historical and cultural ties to the area refer to it by names such as ‘Guangmilash’ and ‘Delelo’.
The Ethio-Sudan border, known for its disputes and poor demarcation, was initially defined by Major Gwynn’s 1902 survey, which Ethiopia deemed unacceptable. Subsequent negotiations, most recently during Omar al-Bashir’s presidency, have sought to settle the matter.
“The military exerted pressure over the disputed land they call ‘Alfashga’. I was aware of senior officers who had a strong personal interest in farming there,” an Ethiopian diplomat who worked in Sudan during Al-Bashir’s tenure told The Reporter Magazine.
The diplomat noted that, unlike Sudan’s government, Ethiopia’s stance on the area’s ownership lacked clarity.
“Farmers strongly feel ownership, but the government doesn’t,” he said. “Sudanese military officials pushed Bashir to pursue demarcation talks, but the Ethiopian government consistently delayed them,” he said.
Amid this protracted border dispute, farmers from both nations have engaged in the joint cultivation of the fertile land, with instances of territorial incursion occurring at various intervals.
The longstanding practice of shared farming along the disputed border largely ceased with the Northern War and the subsequent withdrawal of the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) from camps in the area.
Capitalizing on the northward movement of Ethiopian federal forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, chairperson of the Sovereign Council, deployed Sudanese troops to the area soon after war broke out in Tigray.
Burhan’s forces, reportedly estimated at 6,000 soldiers, occupied the fertile ‘Guangmilash’ area, displacing Ethiopian farmers. Though a reported agreement existed for Sudan to secure the border against TPLF imports, the area remains compromised, and farming has ceased.
According to a land development and management expert in Metemma Woreda, the Sudanese have forcefully occupied three areas with a rough size of 40 square kilometers: Tumet-Mendofa (approximately 11,000 hectares), Delelo (approximately 16,000 hectares), and Forgena (approximately 13,000 hectares).
Between December 2020 and February 2021, requests, especially from the Amhara region, for Sudanese to withdraw from the area produced no result.
Concerned citizens and civic organizations, including the Ethiopian Border Affairs Committee (EBAC), a US based non-governmental organization closely monitoring Ethio-Sudan border issues, condemned the ‘incessant armed invasions and destruction by the Sudanese army, militias, and Janjaweed mercenaries’ and repeatedly urged government intervention.
“Our farming business thrived initially, but it became unsustainable. The difference was clear: Sudanese farmers had military support, while we didn’t. Though the Fano militia provided some backing, it wasn’t sufficient. We were forced out. I’ve switched to trading,” a man who previously operated a farm in the area told The Reporter Magazine.
It was after the cessation of hostilities agreement in the northern war that the Ethiopian government, which had initially been less assertive than Sudan, adopted a relatively stronger stance. In February 2021, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a strongly worded statement condemning Sudan’s ‘escalation and provocative behavior,’ accusing them of invading Ethiopian territory.
The land development and management expert from Metemma told The Reporter Magazine that the Sudanese have now abandoned a large portion of the Delelo area due to fear of retaliation from Ethiopian militias.
While Sudanese forces maintain control over a large section of the land, the substantial portion of the fertile land remains fallow, having been abandoned by both parties due to prevailing regional insecurity.
The area claimed by Sudan stretches from Metemma to Humera, near the Eritrean border. General Burhan showed great interest in the area before he became occupied with the war with his counterpart Hemedti, as evidenced by his 2021 statement, “The Sudanese army will not give up a parcel of the Al-Fashaga Strip area.”
Ethio-South Sudan Border: Clan Interests, the ‘Nuerland’ Sentiment
Two years ago, parliamentary representatives from the newly established Southwestern region reported alarming incidents to the House. They stated that South Sudanese forces had crossed over 200 kilometers into Ethiopian territory, killing people, engaging in gold mining, and selling arms.
“The ongoing killings have decimated one clan to just 50-60 survivors,” one representative told the House. The parliamentarian indicated that these forces had control of more than four woredas.
The MP questioned the federal government’s failure to act and called for military deployment to the affected border region. In response, a Defense Ministry representative stated that this was a matter of priority, in light of the various challenges confronting the defense force.
This is a threat from a young African nation that has traditionally viewed Ethiopia as an ally, given the substantial support Ethiopia provided in its establishment.
Along its 883km border, mainly across the Acobo and Baro rivers with South Sudan, Africa’s youngest nation, Ethiopia still faces border threats, though their frequency has declined, according to Ujulu Gilo, head of the Gambela Regional State Communication Bureau.
“The Murlie clan typically causes problems by crossing our borders. The military is located in the woreda town of Metar, some 35 kilometers from the border. Given the length of the border, controlling it solely with the military is difficult. Empowering the local militia and ensuring the people are alert is the most feasible approach, and this has been done,” he noted.
Many view the threats as arising from localized clan interests, and not as indicative of the South Sudanese government’s intent.
“The South Sudanese government has limited control over these peripheral areas, and I doubt they are supporting these actions. Nevertheless, Ethiopia requires a measured response,” asserts a seasoned Ethiopian diplomat who has experience in Juba.
Riek Machar (PhD), South Sudan’s current Vice President and former rebel leader, once said, “Ethiopia won’t face anything of such nature from the South Sudan side.”
Although South Sudanese tend to perceive Ethiopia as an entity to which they are indebted, the border is not without risk of conflict.
Experts agree that the border with South Sudan still poses a potential risk of conflict. A seasoned diplomat who previously provided advisory services to Juba and is familiar with South Sudanese politics has identified a potential threat that warrants close attention.
The diplomat observed that Nuer elites view the border issue through an ethnic lens, claiming Gambela as part of their territory.
Inhabiting both sides of the border, the Nuer clan saw approximately 400,000 of its people migrate from South Sudan to Gambella as refugees during the protracted war in South Sudan.
“These elites hold a sentiment that they call ‘Nuer land,’ which they assert encompasses Gambella. The concept of ‘Nuer land’ appears to be widespread among the elite population,” said the diplomat.
He believes this sentiment, though not currently a major concern, could pose a future risk.
Ethio-Kenya: Long Peace Disrupted
Ethiopia and Kenya have long enjoyed peaceful state-level relations, with only minor border community disputes over grazing rights. This border, covering a total of 780 kilometers, is also considered well-defined. Nevertheless, even here, border instabilities have been witnessed.
Two major incidents have so far occurred in 2025, including a conflict resulting in 30 deaths. The clash, which took place near Lake Turkana in late February, also saw the displacement of 10,000 Ethiopians.
Although conflicts along the Ethio-Kenya border are usually confined to localized clan disputes, the scale and severity of this event stands in stark contrast to past incidents.
Similarly, the Kenyan government’s recent operations in the border region also represent a notable political development. The operations reportedly targeted Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) forces allegedly involved in illegal mining and drug trafficking within Kenya, suggesting the failure to crack down on the militia on the side of the Ethiopian government has encouraged it to spread out into neighboring countries.
Ethio-Somali Border: New Flare-Up in Troubled History
With a shared border stretching 1,620 kilometers, Ethiopia and Somalia face significant and long-standing challenges. This border is poorly demarcated and has historically been a source of conflict, primarily due to Somalia’s “Greater Somalia” aspirations. However, recent events have introduced a new and unexpected dimension to these tensions.
A significant portion of this border involves Somaliland, a self-declared state that has sought international recognition for the past 33 years. Three months ago, a serious conflict erupted along the border. The conflict, which reportedly resulted in hundreds of deaths, including 30 Ethiopian Somali Regional State police officers, was allegedly triggered by a heavily armed Somaliland force that crossed into Ethiopian territory and opened fire.
The conflict was widely understood to have implications beyond a typical localized territorial dispute as it involved the use of heavy artillery, reportedly identified as belonging to the Somaliland government, thus raising concerns about a potential violation of Ethiopian sovereignty. This incident is particularly alarming given that it originated from a small, unrecognized entity that has a strong desire for recognition from Ethiopia.
While the immediate situation has reportedly been resolved, the implications remain significant, highlighting the challenges Ethiopia faces in safeguarding its territorial integrity.
Ethio-Djibouti Border: A Tiny Nation’s Drone Strike on Ethiopian Soil
The 420-kilometer border Ethiopia shares with Djibouti, a former French colony and one of the world’s smallest nations, is generally well-demarcated. Djibouti is highly dependent on the Ethiopian economy, and the two countries have historically maintained positive relations, particularly concerning border issues. However, a recent incident has raised serious concerns.
Two months ago, the deaths of eight civilians in Elidar Woreda of Ethiopia’s Afar region sparked alarm. These deaths resulted from a drone strike, conducted by the Djiboutian government against militants operating in the border area. The fact that this occurred within Ethiopian territory has raised questions about the respect for Ethiopian sovereignty, even along its traditionally peaceful and well-demarcated borders.
The Eritrean Border: Fears of Renewed Brutal Conflict
This border, Ethiopia’s second longest, stretches approximately 1,033 km (641.9 mi) from Burie in the east, near the Djibouti border, to Humera in the west, near Sudan and delineated by the Tekeze River.
The brutal 1998 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which stemmed largely from border disputes, left a legacy of strained relations and mutual suspicion that persisted for many years after the controversial Algiers Agreement that officially ended the conflict. The border remained heavily militarized until a surprising diplomatic breakthrough in 2018, when Prime Minister Abiy initiated a rapid rapprochement with Eritrea. This led to the opening of the border and a period of free movement of people and goods, but the improvement in relations proved short-lived, and tensions are once again on the rise, with both sides showing signs of preparing for a new conflict.
As tensions with Ethiopia rise, Eritrea has reportedly mobilized reserve troops and engaged in active conscript recruitment. Similar troop mobilization preparations have also been rumored on the Ethiopian side.
Government activists are now emphasizing border issues. However, these issues existed even when Asmara and Addis Ababa enjoyed close relations, and it is important to note that the northern war significantly shaped the current situation.
“The issue is now propagated by government activists as if something new has happened. Not in our villages at least, “ a resident of a border village told The Reporter Magazine.
“The ENDF had been stationed here since the Ethio-Eritrean war; many soldiers even started families. But on the 21st of November 2020, an event occurred that led to their final withdrawal. Eritrean forces then took control of the area and appointed a puppet administration,” a resident of Irob Woreda told The Reporter Magazine.
“Since the northern war, the people of Irob, who were already dissatisfied with the TPLF administration for three decades, have been facing a new form of hardship,” he stated. “Eritrean forces now control nearly half of the eight kebeles in Irob Woreda.”
According to residents, the areas of Aiga Alitena, Wereatlie, Agrale Koma, and Endalgeda are now largely under Eritrean forces’ administration.
A former resident, now living in Adigrat, spoke about his experiences under Eritrean occupation.
“Many, like myself, fled the area. Young people left out of desperation, attempting to reach the Middle East and Europe. A few succeeded, but most perished in the deserts or at sea. Those who remained, clinging to their ancestral lands and resigned to a life of hardship, now live under pressure,” he said.
Locals in the area face a choice imposed by the Eritrean administration: embrace ‘Eritreaness’ or leave. Consequently, some have left, leaving others to endure the resulting hardships.
“There are Catholic schools in Aiga, Wreaile, and Michea. The Eritrean government funds teachers’ salaries and has implemented an Eritrean curriculum in the schools,” said one resident.
Eritrean forces entered Ethiopia during the northern war at the federal government’s invitation and have remained despite international human rights concerns and demands from the Tigray region for their withdrawal.
According to residents, services such as healthcare are currently unavailable in Irob. Similar problems exist in Zalambessa.
During a press briefing three months ago, General Tsadkan Gebretinsae, Vice President of the Tigray Interim Administration, disclosed that Eritrean forces are still occupying 52 kebeles in Tigray. He urged the federal government to ‘take action to uphold the nation’s sovereignty.’
The Ethiopian government initially denied their presence, then acknowledged it and promised their departure, a promise that has gone largely unfulfilled. Now, the government has abruptly shifted its position, framing their presence in terms of Ethiopian sovereignty.
New Path to Border Peace
Despite Ethiopians’ strong sense of sovereignty, which unites those with otherwise conflicting views, the nation’s sovereignty has been compromised, particularly in recent years.
The fact that the majority of Ethiopia’s borders remain poorly demarcated is also puzzling. Experts suggest that the potential for mineral and natural gas resources, compounded by poor demarcation, may contribute to border conflicts.
It is also evident that communities along the borders with South Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Kenya often have surprisingly strong connections, including shared clan or ethnic affiliations. These commonalities ought to facilitate cooperation and promote peace in the border areas.
Reflecting a modern shift away from border securitization towards border management, Belete (PhD), proposes that border issues are optimally addressed through collaborative development that yields advantages for neighboring communities, provided that thorough border demarcation is first established.
An immediate and critical cause, though often unacknowledged, is the ENDF’s diversion from national defense to internal conflicts. This diversion detracts from its primary role of safeguarding national sovereignty, thereby exposing the nation to substantial risks of external aggression and broader security breaches.
