Perhaps more than ever, a fragile Somalia is once again hurtling toward a dangerous junction of political and security upheaval. The immediate trigger is December 31, when U.S. support for UNSOS—the UN logistics mission funding AUSSOM—expires. For neighboring Ethiopia, which shares a long border and has spent years fighting alongside Somali forces, this approaching deadline is a critical test of its own national security.
This concern was shared by panelists who participated in a seminar on Security Risks and Regional Stability, hosted by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) on September 3, 2026, in Addis Ababa. They cautioned that without a clear replacement plan, an orderly transition could quickly devolve into an improvised withdrawal.
Indeed, UNSOS has been providing aviation support, fuel, rations, troop rotations, and medical evacuations. Yet logistics may prove easier to manage than politics. Somalia’s deeper issue is that its political settlement is unraveling at the precise moment its security architecture is shrinking.
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A Constitutional Crisis
Ahmed Abdi, a Somali Member of Parliament and secretary of the defense committee, described the current situation as the country’s “most serious constitutional crisis since the federal system was created in 2012.” While previous disputes focused on elections, the current standoff centers on a fundamental question: who holds the ultimate authority to define Somalia’s governing rules?
Relations between Mogadishu and federal member states such as Puntland and Jubaland have deteriorated into open confrontation. At the core of the dispute is a long-standing question with immediate consequences: is Somalia shifting toward a centralized state, or will regional governments retain meaningful political and security authority?
Abdi argues that the federal compact never clearly defined who has final say over elections, security forces, and constitutional amendments. That legal ambiguity has now spilled from constitutional texts onto the battlefield, with direct operational consequences.
He highlights a striking pattern: when the federal government and regional states cooperated around 2022, Somali forces made substantial gains against Al-Shabaab. Conversely, as their political relationship fractured, the militant group reclaimed lost territory and advanced toward the capital.
Seminar participants revealed that Al-Shabaab is now operating roughly 50 kilometers from Mogadishu. The strategic lesson is clear: political paralysis creates immediate opportunities for an enemy that has no need to win elections.
Despite these headwinds, Abdi remains more optimistic than some foreign observers that diplomatic pressure can still force the key factions toward a consensus on voting. “International actors have been pushing the federal government and opposition to agree on an election modality,” he noted. From his perspective, the minimum viable compromise is straightforward: reach a consensus on the timing and framework of the vote.
Samira Gaid, a Mogadishu-based security analyst, agrees that political consensus is indispensable, but she remains skeptical of an “elections-first” approach. A rushed agreement, she cautions, risks establishing a timetable without addressing the structural grievances driving the standoff.
While Abdi views an electoral agreement as the primary bridge to stability, Gaid sees a broader political settlement as the necessary foundation—with elections forming just one component. Crucially, both analysts reject the premise that a ballot alone can repair Somalia’s fractured federal bargain.
The political institutions themselves compound the crisis. Abdi explained that while parliament has passed party and electoral laws and established an independent electoral body, the commission remains confined to Mogadishu and lacks the trust of opposition forces. Furthermore, Somalia still lacks the essential infrastructure for direct elections, including civil registration, a functional constitutional court, and campaign finance regulations.
Ultimately, Somalia’s challenge is less technical than institutional: it is a crisis of legitimacy. An election whose outcome is accepted by only one faction will not yield stability.
The Security Transition Dilemma
The political crisis arrives as Somalia’s security transition reaches its most perilous phase.
Gashaw Ayferam (PhD), an expert specializing in Horn of Africa geopolitics at the Institute of Foreign Affairs, describes the nation as facing a “dual crisis” of political fragmentation and a worsening security dilemma. He emphasizes the fragile financial architecture sustaining the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). After nearly two decades of African Union deployments, the enterprise faces an existential threat as the United States prepares to cease funding operations through UNSOS after December 31, 2026.
Gashaw outlines several theoretical substitutes: bilateral agreements with Gulf States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or China; larger contributions from Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs); the African Peace Fund; or renewed UN backing. None offer an easy fix. Key troop contributors—Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Uganda—are already under severe fiscal strain, while the AU’s internal resources cannot replicate a massive UN-supported logistics machine.
Samira highlights a broader systemic threat. “The issue is not limited to direct American funding,” she warned. “This decision has shaken the wider multi-donor support system, endangering the aviation, fuel, logistics, and medical evacuation capabilities that keep troops alive in the field.” She noted that while Mogadishu wants AUSSOM extended for another 18 to 24 months, relying on Washington to reverse course is a risky strategy.
Abu Sherif, Senior Political Officer at the AU’s Peace Support Operations Division, offered a more measured perspective. He noted that the AU has been evaluating alternatives since receiving formal notification from the U.S. in July.
“We are considering additional partners, internal African mechanisms, and alternative mission configurations,” Abu explained, stressing that a total drawdown remains a worst-case scenario rather than the plan. Contrary to the prevailing pessimism, the AU does not view December 31, 2026, as a hard cliff where troops simply vanish. Instead, the leadership is working backward from that deadline, treating October and November as critical windows to finalize a joint Somalia-AU proposal for the UN Security Council.
Ahmed noted that this proposal aims to right-size the mission and establish a viable replacement logistics framework.
While sensible on paper, assembling an alternative force is far easier than replacing its supply chain. As Samira observed: “Twelve thousand troops can be put on paper quickly. Keeping them supplied across Somalia is another matter—aviation, fuel, medical evacuations, and field support require daily cash flow.”
She concluded that the emerging reality may force a leaner, more concentrated AU presence focused strictly on core security mandates, rather than an attempt to replicate AUSSOM’s current footprint as its funding framework collapses.
Ethiopia’s Particular Exposure
Selam Tadesse, a Horn of Africa security analyst and researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, views the consequences of an AUSSOM drawdown through a dual-track security lens. Ethiopia maintains troops within the multilateral AUSSOM framework while simultaneously holding bilateral security agreements with Mogadishu. “The funding cuts primarily affect the former,” she told The Reporter Magazine, though she noted that this distinction may become irrelevant if the broader security environment degrades.
Selam stresses that whether a dangerous vacuum emerges in Somalia depends heavily on how the departure is managed. “An abrupt pullout could trigger chaos, but a structured, well-coordinated strategy alongside adaptive mechanisms from security partners could mitigate major fallout,” she argues.
Her prescription is two-pronged: Ethiopia should actively shape the diplomatic terms of the AU transition while establishing robust national contingency measures. This pragmatic strategy avoids relying on either an American policy reversal or the assumption that Somalia can suddenly manage its security independently.
Samira reaches a similar conclusion from a different angle. She warns that a reduction in forward-deployed AU forces will push security risks toward neighboring borders, potentially forcing Ethiopia to adjust its military posture. The implications are financial as well as operational: a cheaper international mission could ultimately evolve into a far more costly national security burden for Addis Ababa.
Gashaw is similarly concerned about a security vacuum, but places greater emphasis on international diplomacy. He underscores that for nearly two decades, regional stability in the Horn has relied on African Union peacekeeping deployments—evolving from AMISOM to ATMIS, and now AUSSOM. Yet, with AUSSOM’s mandate facing a crucial deadline on December 31, 2026, the mission confronts an existential financial crisis that threatens nearly twenty years of counter-terrorism progress.
“This financial crisis reached a boiling point following a 25 percent budget cut for AUSSOM and the announcement from the U.S. Mission to the AU that Washington will cease funding the operation after 2026,” Gashaw noted.
He points out that Troop-Contributing Countries (TCCs)—including Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Uganda—are already operating under severe fiscal constraints. The impending withdrawal of Western backing has prompted high-stakes summitry in Kampala, bringing together TCC defense ministers, IGAD, and AU representatives to map out a path forward.
For Gashaw, this funding crisis also threatens to fracture Somalia’s internal politics. Should Mogadishu enter into unilateral defense arrangements with external powers such as Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or Egypt to protect the capital, autonomous regions like Puntland and Jubaland might pursue counter-balancing alliances with actors like the United Arab Emirates or Israel.
“This proxy dynamic would exacerbate political fragmentation at a time when the central government is already embroiled in disputes with member states and opposition factions over electoral governance,” Gashaw explained. “Early counter-offensive gains made under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud risk being reversed as political infighting distracts from military pressure on the ground.”
He stresses that neighboring states—especially Ethiopia, which shares a long border and has spent decades countering regional extremism—face immediate security risks. Mitigating this fallout requires an integrated approach addressing politics and security in tandem.
Selam echoes these concerns, adding that Somalia’s internal fragmentation risks inviting external powers into the region, effectively introducing non-regional rivalries directly onto Ethiopia’s doorstep. Furthermore, when political survival consumes Mogadishu’s attention, joint efforts to combat Al-Shabaab suffer.
“Because Al-Shabaab represents a global terrorist network rather than a localized militia, frontline neighbors—Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti—will absorb the immediate fallout of any security failure,” Selam emphasized. “While troop-contributing nations further afield can withdraw behind distant borders, neighboring states do not have that luxury.”
To prevent destabilization, she argues that frontline nations must aggressively shape the diplomatic terms of the AUSSOM exit within the AU while developing independent security buffers at home.
Meanwhile, Gashaw recommends that the AU establish a dedicated task force to lobby traditional Western donors, re-engage Washington, and build structured financing partnerships with emerging Asian and Middle Eastern economies. He adds that TCC nations must form a cohesive coalition to negotiate funding and prevent fragmented, unilateral deals from dividing the region. Ultimately, international stakeholders must support inclusive political dialogue inside Somalia so that its national security architecture can eventually stand on its own.
“Without a coordinated, fully funded transition, two decades of counter-terrorism achievements risk being undone, leaving Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa vulnerable to renewed instability,” Gashaw warns.
Samira concurs that while regional states remain committed to Somalia’s stability, a shortfall in logistical backing will inevitably push security risks outward. “For neighboring states like Ethiopia, a reduction in forward-deployed AU forces in outlying regions will likely require significant defense realignments and border fortifications to mitigate spillover risks,” she noted
