Geopolitical competition across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea is entering a volatile new phase. While regional rivalries along this maritime corridor are hardly new, the stakes have shifted dramatically as Middle Eastern powers seek greater dominance over one of the world’s most critical trade choke points.
Saudi Arabia-led formation of a 13-country Red Sea security coalition represents the latest attempt to institutionalize that ambition as the Red Sea trade corridor grows both increasingly vulnerable to threats and more critical in light of disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz.
Declarations of a blockade targeting Saudi vessels in the Red Sea by the Iran-backed and Yemen-based Houthi rebels on ships near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have thrust the narrow waterway, which connects the southern Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean, into the global spotlight.
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Riyadh’s coalition brings together states including Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia—alongside external powers such as Bangladesh, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey. Rear Admiral Abdullah bin Salem Al-Shehri has been appointed to lead the multinational maritime defense effort tasked with securing regional navigation.
Though it was not officially stated as part of the alliance Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement on August 7, 2026. Reports indicate that the three countries have in essence agreed to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Article 5-like clause—an attack on one signatory would be considered an attack on all of them.
Yet behind these tactical security maneuvers lies a fundamental geopolitical question: is the Red Sea becoming the primary arena for a renewed regional struggle over power, security, and economic leverage, and where does this structural shift leave a landlocked power like Ethiopia?
For Ambassador Tiruneh Zena, a career diplomat with four decades of experience in foreign relations, answering this requires looking beyond immediate tactical events to the broader structural transformation of the international system itself.
He views the proliferation of new regional alliances as a “direct consequence of a growing global power vacuum.” Tiruneh observes that the international order established after the Second World War provided a clear strategic framework where the US and the Soviet Union dominated competing spheres of influence, forcing smaller states to align with superpower umbrellas.
Today, that structure has broken down.
“Today’s world lacks a single security guarantor or a world leader resulting in an unstable environment where regional actors form military and economic blocs to defend themselves or counter emerging adversaries,” said the diplomat. “Confidence in traditional superpower guarantees has eroded, driving capable regional states to seek strategic autonomy while proactively forging partnerships to prevent crises ahead.”
Tiruneh foresees that what he describes as an “anti-Ethiopia” coalition will elicit responses from other countries.
“The Saudi-led alliance consists of countries with poor ties to various other states,” he said. “How would Israel view the coalition? Greece does not have good ties with Turkey. How would India view an alliance with Pakistan in it? I guess that action will bring a counter-reaction from other states, but I have no answer as to how or under what conditions.”
The Middle East has a long history of military alliances and collective security initiatives. Looking back at the Arab-Israeli wars, Tiruneh stressed the gap between the formation of coalitions and their actual ability to produce lasting geopolitical outcomes.
“However, nations could react when they see a potential power bloc in their region, which worsens tensions,” he said. “Ethiopia will meticulously monitor such unfolding situations because Egypt is in the coalition. To withstand such pressure, Ethiopia will take similar measures—though it will take time to see what happens ahead.”
Another veteran diplomat offered a different view, suggesting the new Saudi-led alliance may not pose a threat to Ethiopia. Although he partially agrees with Tiruneh’s analysis of the shifts in regional dynamics, Asnake Kefale (PhD), lecturer of political science and international relations at Addis Ababa University, sees the Saudi initiative through a complementary yet distinctly focused view.
Asnake frames Riyadh’s move specifically as a signal of a shifting Middle Eastern security landscape—the potential retreat of the US from its historical role as the Middle East’s principal security guarantor.
“Decades of heavy reliance on Washington’s military umbrella have given way to deep skepticism among Gulf countries following recent regional crises,” he said, highlighting that this environment has forced Gulf nations to experiment with self-organized security structure, even as the ultimate trajectory of these new groupings remains uncertain.
Tiruneh concurs, observing that Saudi’s age-old reliance on US protection and the petro-dollar is waning.
“That has been eroded and the country is looking for other alternatives,” said the diplomat.
Comparing current efforts to Cold War-era accords like the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), which was anchored in a unified ideological effort to contain Soviet influence, Asnake argues that today’s alignments noticeably lack a shared foundational vision or value system.
Yet, against the view of Tiruneh’s skepticism regarding coalition effectiveness, Asnake believes these modern alliances may actually endure longer than past coalitions because they are driven by hard transactional necessity rather than rigid ideology.
Still, Asnake aligns with Tiruneh on the reality of severe internal friction.
The participating nations harbor deep historical contradictions, he says, highlighting that Saudi Arabia and Turkey spent years competing for regional influence, a rift severely deepened by the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul. Furthermore, Egypt maintains a delicate relationship with both Riyadh and Ankara over regional leadership, while member states diverge sharply on Israel—ranging from Ankara’s vocal opposition to Cairo’s functional cooperation and Riyadh’s pragmatic flexibility.
“A coalition can be assembled around a temporary common threat, but constructing a durable security alliance requires a deep convergence of underlying values,” said Asnake.
Another researcher shifts the perspective from grand strategy and military alignments to structural law.
Gashaw Ayferam (PhD), who specializes in Horn of Africa geopolitics and hydropolitics at the Institute of Foreign Affairs, raised a different angle to the debate: who actually holds the right to shape the rules governing the Red Sea?
While Tiruneh and Asnake focus on state motivations and security vacuums, Gashaw identifies a profound governance gap at the heart of the Red Sea crisis. For him, the core problem is not merely the rise of competing military pacts, but, “the total absence of an inclusive legal and institutional framework capable of regulating the waterway for all invested stakeholders.”
“A functional governance model must engage non-littoral nations, neighboring hinterlands, and international users alongside coastal states,” he states.
Gashaw further argues that existing frameworks remain fundamentally flawed due to institutional bias. While the European Union, the US, and littoral states have all established maritime security mechanisms—most notably the Council of Arab and African States Bordering the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden established in 2019—these initiatives suffer from intentional exclusion.
“By anchoring membership strictly in state sovereignty and territoriality principles, the 2019 Council created an exclusive bloc and this framework marginalized critical regional actors, most notably Ethiopia and Israel,” he further pointed out.
“Despite being landlocked, Ethiopia is the largest economy in the Horn of Africa, heavily reliant on Red Sea trade routes for its survival,” he said, adding, “Excluding such an important nation creates an unstable arrangement that mistakes coastal possession for comprehensive governance.”
Gashaw emphasizes that this exclusion springs from competing regional strategies between key Middle Eastern players. Historically, Egypt sought an exclusive Red Sea cooperation mechanism rooted in strict territoriality and regional closeness, whereas Saudi Arabia pursued a platform tailored to place Riyadh at the center of regional maritime leadership.
“Though Cairo and Riyadh joined hands to form the 2019 Council, Ethiopia opposed the structure, arguing that geographical proximity and total economic exposure give it an undeniable stake in maritime affairs,” he said. Although the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) responded by creating its own Task Force on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to amplify non-littoral voices, the fundamental conflict over who gets to govern the maritime corridor remains unresolved.
Another veteran diplomat, speaking to The Reporter Magazine anonymously, predicts the Saudi-led pact will prove short-lived and ultimately will not pose a meaningful threat to Ethiopia’s national security.
His perspective stands in sharp counterpoint to Gashaw’s warning of persistent structural exclusion and Asnake’s concern over long-term proxy entanglement. Where the scholars see an enduring geopolitical shift that demands structural countermeasures, the retired diplomat views the coalition as a transient political construct that will dissolve before it can alter the regional balance of power.
However, as Gashaw points out, the crisis in the Red Sea encompasses far more than state-level diplomacy or short-lived defense pacts. Houthi attacks targeting commercial vessels in the north, combined with persistent piracy and armed piracy in the south around Somalia, have created a continuous arc of insecurity extending from the Suez Canal to the western Indian Ocean.
In that regard, both Asnake and Gashaw stress the view on long-term regional maneuvering; that Saudi Arabia’s coalition should not be viewed merely as an emergency response to maritime attacks. Instead, Riyadh is taking advantage of the immediate security crisis to realize a longstanding ambition: solidifying its dominant position across the Red Sea corridor.
Gashaw went on to say that in modern geo-economics, maritime security cannot be separated from broader economic supply chains. Power flows not only through naval chokepoints, but through the interconnected web of deep-water ports, roads, logistics centers, and energy corridors that bind maritime trade to inland markets.
“State actors that control or influence these supply networks gain immense leverage over regional development and foreign policy alignments,” he said. “Saudi Arabia’s strategic vision relies on transforming itself into a global logistics and commercial hub, making influence over Red Sea shipping lanes essential to its national interest.”
“In the same vein though Ethiopia is landlocked its economic trajectory cannot be separated from Red Sea maritime infrastructure and the logistics hubs through which its international trade flows,” he further described. “This dynamics creates a strategic paradox for Ethiopia—it possesses no coastline, yet its economic viability and national security are profoundly exposed to maritime developments.”
Gashaw defends the position that excluding Ethiopia from formal Red Sea governance does not eliminate its strategic interests; it merely forces Addis Ababa to secure those interests through alternative, competing arrangements.
Meanwhile, Asnake warns of a grave risk that extends beyond decision-making tables: external power plays risk importing Middle Eastern rivalries directly into the fragile political landscape of the Horn of Africa.
“The competing interests of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, historical friction involving Qatar, and the spillover effects of the conflict in Yemen all threaten to cross the Red Sea,” he said.
This dynamic reflects the broader global transformation outlined by both Tiruneh and Asnake. As the post-Second World War order centered on American hegemony shifts toward a dynamic multipolar structure, rigid security arrangements are giving way to short-term transactional alignments. In this environment, tactical military coalitions will form, dissolve, and reconstitute rapidly based on immediate self-interest rather than shared ideological commitments.
For Ethiopia, this reality means foreign policy cannot rely on permanent assumptions; today’s strategic partner may become tomorrow’s commercial competitor, requiring continuous adaptability.
Direct coastal states like Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia, alongside nearby nations like Kenya and landlocked Ethiopia, share a common interest in the stability of the Red Sea corridor. Yet the region lacks an empowered mechanism capable of projecting a unified stance.
Gashaw suggests that pan-African and sub-regional institutions, such as the African Union and IGAD, must step forward to build an inclusive Red Sea platform.
“The objective would not be to exclude Middle Eastern or global powers, but to ensure that Horn of Africa nations negotiate from a position of collective strength rather than remaining passive subjects of external initiatives,” he stressed.
He also maintains that any durable solution to Red Sea security must move beyond restrictive coastal definitions. “A stable governance model must include non-littoral economies, major international trading partners, and key regional actors like Ethiopia whose survival depends on open sea lanes. Relying on exclusive coastal clubs will only exacerbate regional rivalries and guarantee recurring instability.”
However, divergent from Gashaw’s focus on external institutional building and multilateral inclusion, Tiruneh offers a strikingly different prioritization. For the diplomat, the ultimate answer to regional vulnerability does not lie in creating new diplomatic institutions abroad, but in building strong capacity at home. He prefers that Ethiopia’s ability to navigate an increasingly competitive regional order will depend primarily on the strength of its own domestic foundations rather than its inclusion in external security frameworks.
Tiruneh outlines three core pillars essential for safeguarding Ethiopia’s position from within are robust economic development that creates meaningful job opportunities for its growing youth population, a modern defense force capable of deterring external threats, and unshakeable internal unity.
“By doing so, we can become an anchor regional power, opening up new opportunities for our nation,” he noted. “On the other hand, for a nation fractured by internal conflict, sustaining economic growth is impossible; the opposite will happen.”
