It has been approximately two months since the joint US-Israeli operation against Iran commenced. The consequences of this conflict have transcended the borders of the three primary states involved, creating a geopolitical ripple effect felt in every corner of the globe—from the poorest African countries, including Ethiopia, to developed Western nations and the United States itself. As tensions escalate, a diplomatic or military ‘way out’ appears far more complex than even President Trump initially calculated.
Eric Lob, a professor of politics and international relations at Florida International University, is among the leading US scholars on the Middle East, with a specialized focus on Iran. Having lived in Iran and authored extensive research—including a book on the region at large—he offers an informed perspective on the ongoing war and its repercussions. The Reporter Magazine’s Bewket Abebe spoke with Professor Lob to better understand the evolving dynamics and emerging realities. EXCERPTS:
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The Reporter Magazine: Let’s begin with the most recent development: the extension of the ceasefire that was set to expire on April 22nd. President Trump announced the extension, attributing the decision to a request from Pakistani leadership. What does this extension signal to you?
Professor Eric Lob: It is still a very tenuous situation with a lot of uncertainty. President Trump had indicated that he would resume hostilities against Iran and bomb it, including civilian infrastructure, bridges, and power plants—threats that he’s made in the past. The Pakistanis, along with other regional allies and partners, convinced President Trump to hold off on doing that. But at the same time, we saw some progress last weekend. President Trump was able to broker a 10-day ceasefire with Israel and Lebanon involving Hezbollah. This was something that the Iranians wanted as part of their ceasefire agreement with the United States because they didn’t just want attacks to stop against Iran; they also wanted attacks by Israel to stop against Hezbollah and Lebanon.
After that agreement was reached, the Iranians temporarily reopened the Strait of Hormuz, which is what President Trump wanted and what a lot of countries want to be able to alleviate the economic pain that this conflict is causing. At the same time, though, President Trump and the United States refused to lift the blockade against Iran, and so Iran quickly reclosed the Strait of Hormuz. We’re now seeing tit-for-tat exchanges where the United States has seized two oil tankers, I believe with Iranian flags, and where Iran has fired on several tankers and then today seized two tankers of its own belonging to other countries. So, right now, we’re in a state of lower-intensity escalation following the ceasefire that was announced two weeks ago, but it’s a very fragile situation. The final piece is that there are a lot of questions surrounding whether we’re going to see Iranian and American negotiators come back to Islamabad, because Vice President Vance was supposed to go there yesterday; he did not. Right now, the Iranians are saying that they’re not going to go and negotiate with the US until the US blockade is lifted and until the US makes more reasonable offers to Iran from a less maximalist position.
What level of commitment do you see from these three parties—the US, Iran, and Israel—to de-escalate the situation and normalize relations? And how likely is it that their terms will be adjusted to reach an agreement?
I’m really not sure what the Israeli position is in all of this. They seem to want to, just like they’re doing in Lebanon and like they’ve done in Gaza, they just seem to want to try to bring Iran to its knees. In the June war as well as in this current, most recent war, they’ve attacked not just Iran’s military personnel and infrastructure, but also civilian population infrastructure. So, I’m not really sure what the diplomatic or even negotiating position is for the Israelis.
But regarding the Americans and the Iranians, they’re negotiating over a number of issues, and the first is the nuclear program. Back in 2015, when the Americans and Iranians reached a deal, it took them 20 months to negotiate; to think that was going to happen in Islamabad in 21 hours is unrealistic. On the nuclear issue alone, right now the two sides are far apart. The Trump administration since 2025 has repeatedly demanded zero enrichment and full dismantlement of the Iran nuclear program. The Iranians, as signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—which by the way the Israelis have not signed—are insisting that they have a sovereign right to enrich uranium at peaceful levels, even if they’ve exceeded those levels since 2018. They’re saying that they have the right under the NPT to enrich at three to four percent for peaceful civilian purposes. Both sides have to find a middle ground somewhere between zero enrichment and that three to four percent. The Iranians also still have a large stockpile of highly enriched uranium at 60 percent.
The United States wants that uranium shipped out of the country to a third-party country, like Russia. The Iranians right now just don’t feel like they could trust the United States to do that, feeling they would be losing leverage in negotiations and a deterrent against future military action. And that’s just the nuclear issue; there’s also the issue of Iran’s missiles and proxies like Hezbollah, which the Iranians don’t even want to discuss because those are critical elements to their deterrence. The United States wants restrictions on their ballistic missiles and on their support for proxies, but the Iranians believe that’s a red line.
Now we have a new issue regarding the Strait of Hormuz. Whether the United States can convince Iran to return to the status quo ante of an international waterway with free passage, or whether the waterway will continue to be under Iranian control and sovereignty. Iran may view it as a revenue stream to rebuild its shattered economy and devastated infrastructure. The Iranians were asking for reparations from the United States, but if those are not coming, then they would potentially charge countries somewhere around two million dollars to pass through. Another way they could get revenues is by persuading the United States to unfreeze assets and relieve sanctions, something the US has already done temporarily to try to stabilize oil prices. Finally, the Iranians are looking for guarantees from the United States because they’ve already been in two wars with the US and Israel in less than a year. They want a guarantee that there will be no future American and Israeli attacks, but up until now, the United States has not been interested in offering such a guarantee.
In this case, how likely is a de-escalation in the near future? What is your outlook on how that might unfold?
I think we’d have to see a radical change of approach here. The fact that there was a ceasefire announced two weeks ago was a step in the right direction. We saw a temporary opening of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran, and we’ve seen largely a cessation of hostilities between the United States and Iran, and between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and Iran. So, there are some encouraging signs. The fact that the Americans and the Iranians met two weekends ago in Islamabad for 21 hours was a positive sign. Nonetheless, both sides are very far apart and there is skepticism that they will be able to close the gap on these issues and prevent further escalations. Even if people can somewhat breathe a sigh of relief with this ceasefire extension, there’s still a lot of uncertainty and the possibility of increased escalation moving forward.
The Iranians have said that they will not go back to the negotiating table until the US blockade is lifted. They have also said that they feel they’re negotiating with a US partner or entity that is really trying to get them to capitulate or surrender on a number of issues, and they want to be able to find more of a middle ground. Since President Trump came back into office in 2025, there have been two previous cycles of negotiations between the US and the Iranians, and both times they ended abruptly with American and Israeli military action. So, there’s a lot of distrust on the side of the Iranians. Not only are they concerned about the US maximalist position, but they’re also worried that these talks may just be a ploy or a ruse for further military action and escalation down the road. This explains why there’s so much caution and hesitancy on the part of the Iranians right now to re-engage.
It has been two months since the joint US-Israel operation against Iran began, and much has happened, including significant changes in leadership in Tehran. However, the operation has not remained contained within Tehran, nor even the Middle East; countries around the world have been affected—from the most powerful to the most vulnerable. How would you characterize the response of international actors, particularly the world’s major powers?
largest economic shock on the global economy since 1973, potentially even bigger than the one we saw with the Arab oil embargo. We’re seeing very similar effects today, if not even worse.
There seems to be an international consensus to end this conflict as soon as possible and to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to ease the economic pain. This war has created arguably the largest economic shock on the global economy since 1973, potentially even bigger than the one we saw with the Arab oil embargo. We’re seeing very similar effects today, if not even worse. There’s an incentive for countries—whether they’re powerful and wealthier countries like China or countries with weaker economies like Pakistan—to mediate because they’re feeling the economic pain.
What do you foresee regarding the reactions of world powers like Russia and China if this situation continues?
Russia and China oppose the war, but reports suggest they are providing military assistance and intelligence sharing to help Iranians strike targets more accurately. This conflict has been a win for Russia
Russia and China oppose the war, but reports suggest they are providing military assistance and intelligence sharing to help Iranians strike targets more accurately. This conflict has been a win for Russia due to increased oil prices and temporary sanctions relief provided by the US. This relief frustrated European allies who see it as funding the Russian war machine against Ukraine.
China is faring worse because it imports significant petroleum from the Persian Gulf. They are performing a balancing act: they want to see the Iranians hold their ground against the United States, but they do not want to antagonize President Trump and risk derailing their planned meeting in Beijing in mid-May.
Should we anticipate any bold moves from other countries?
I am skeptical. The Gulf states are in a precarious situation; their infrastructure has been damaged by Iranian drones and they have been unable to export oil through the Strait of Hormuz. While the UAE has been hawkish, none of these states have fully gotten involved because they have to continue dealing with the Iranians in their own neighborhood once the war ends.
The Europeans and NATO members are also hesitant. They are focusing on diplomacy and trying to assemble a coalition that excludes all belligerents. NATO members argue that this situation does not meet the standards of Article 5. Most countries, with Pakistan leading the charge, are leaning more on diplomacy because they have assessed that there is no military solution to this crisis.
The United States and Israel have found themselves largely isolated in this war. A lot of states realize that this is not going to be resolved with military action; it will be resolved with diplomacy. You see countries like France and the UK trying to assemble a diplomatic coalition to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and de-escalate tensions. Countries like Pakistan and the Arab Gulf states have tried to mediate and send messages between Tehran and Washington to move this in a constructive direction. This is a conflict that no one is benefiting from; everyone is suffering from high oil and gas prices and even commodity prices like fertilizer, which is creating food and aid insecurity for some countries. This is highly problematic for the global economy and the international system.
You noted that no one stands to benefit from this conflict. In your assessment, what are the strategic gains and losses for both the US and Israel thus far?
It’s hard to see what the United States is gaining. President Trump campaigned on the promise of ending these kinds of wars and lowering prices on an “America First” platform, but this war has contradicted those promises and raised questions among Americans about how it serves US interests.
There was never an argument made for this war, and many analysts say Iran did not pose an imminent threat. This war was announced very quickly in the middle of the night on social media, and the president did not address the nation for over a month into the war. Congress didn’t really have a chance to weigh in on this, as they were informed only after or shortly before operations were underway. There is a question about the legality of the war and what US interest it serves.
This is happening during an election year for Congress in November, and Republicans are worried they’re going to lose seats because of this. Across the board, Americans are impacted; farmers are worried about staying in business this year due to high fertilizer costs.
The United States is entangled in another Middle East war, and Americans are feeling the economic effects, with gas prices going up 30 to 40 percent since this war started and inflation remaining high. This is happening during an election year for Congress in November, and Republicans are worried they’re going to lose seats because of this. Across the board, Americans are impacted; farmers are worried about staying in business this year due to high fertilizer costs. There are second-order effects on the grocery store, supermarkets, and mortgage rates. There is a long list of how this war has affected the United States economically, not to mention other countries. Of course, there’s also a human cost to all of this as well, with casualties in the region.
There’s also concern about the US’s reputation. Launching this war without consulting allies and partners and disregarding the wishes of states like Oman that had been mediating. Specifically, the President Trump administration has been erratic, making statements that could change from one hour to the next. One moment, the president said he was not going to extend the ceasefire and was going to bomb civilian infrastructure, which some would say is a war crime, and then hours later, he agreed to extend the ceasefire. This has created so much uncertainty and raised questions among countries in and out of the region about the US’s credibility and reliability as an ally.
How about Israel?
Israel, we have seen clearly, particularly after October 7, 2023, that it leans heavily on military action, but there is no diplomatic or political endgame in any of this. They’ve had this strategy which they call “mowing the grass” or the Dahiya doctrine, which has evolved into not just hitting military personnel but also civilians, believing that could pressure populations to turn against adversaries. But the problem is that has not seemed to bear fruit; Hamas still exists in Gaza and Hezbollah still exists in Lebanon, even if they’ve been weakened.
With all of the killing, death, and destruction, the Iranian regime is still there, even if the personnel have changed. They were just yesterday displaying their missiles and drones to show they still have capabilities to retaliate.
Israel has also suffered a reputational cost. What Israel has done in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran has been an indiscriminate campaign and collective punishment not just against combatants but also against civilians. This raises all sorts of questions and President Trump has actually played into this; at times the US has also hit Iranian civilian targets, like the destruction of an Iranian school that killed hundreds of schoolgirls on the first day of the war. President Trump is now embarking on the same path as the way Israel has been operating in this region for years, which is raising strategic, ethical, and relational questions.
ICC arrest warrants have been issued for Prime Minister Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant for alleged war crimes in Gaza. The ICC ruled that the case South Africa brought against Israel on genocide has merit. Whether these decisions are respected or not, they still have a reputational cost.
On the other hand, there are analysts who argue that Israel’s way of doing business is primarily about prioritizing its perceived interests regardless of international opinion. They believe the resulting reputational damage does not actually matter to Israel, nor does it lead to de-escalation, as long as its most powerful ally, the US, stands by its side. What is your take on that?
As a matter of fact, there are more and more reports that Israel is losing support in the United States, among not just average Americans who oppose their tax dollars being used for military aid, but even among political pundits and officials. This is becoming very problematic for the future of the relationship.
Hasn’t Iran been weakened since the operation in various ways, including the loss of key leadership and its strategic roadmap? Isn’t that exactly what Israel wants? If that’s the case—where one actor is benefiting from a conflict that you mentioned could be ‘potentially worse than the 1973 Arab embargo’—how can such a globally disruptive conflict end anytime soon?
Well, although there is a disagreement between the Israeli security establishment and Israeli politicians, there seems to be a doctrine of weakening neighbors so they can’t pose a threat. By killing senior Iranian leaders and striking military and civilian targets, Israel is setting Iran back and reducing the probability that Iran will pose a threat to Israel. But there are unintended consequences on the ground. The fact is that the Iranian regime is still intact, even if the personnel are different, because Iran is a developed state. The Iranian state is composed of a number of individuals and institutions involved in the decision-making processes, and we’re seeing them at work now.
Furthermore, what the United States and Israel have done has actually empowered individuals in the regime that are even more hardline, militarized, and securitized. This doesn’t bode well for internal activists in Iran who want political change (many of them do), nor for allies and partners seeking a more conciliatory Iran. While important moderates like the president and the foreign minister remain in place, they are increasingly dominated by hardliners.
This system was orchestrated by Ali Khamenei himself, who put hardliners in key positions and had a four-level succession plan in anticipation of his assassination. So, the regime is still in place. While you could argue Iran has been degraded militarily, it still has the capability to strike back and retaliate, as we saw today with the seizure of two oil tankers.
Even with the heavy US and Israeli bombardment, they were able to continue launching drones and missiles not just at US bases and Israeli territory, but also at Arab Gulf states throughout the war.
The bottom line is that from Israel’s perspective, they may want to weaken their adversaries to their benefit, but in the process, they are also losing goodwill in the region.
many are concerned—even if they won’t say it publicly. Although nations like Bahrain and the UAE normalized relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords, behind closed doors, there is a growing worry that Israel’s actions are creating as much regional instability as Iran’s.
When speaking with analysts and officials from some of the Arab Gulf states, it becomes clear that many are concerned—even if they won’t say it publicly. Although nations like Bahrain and the UAE normalized relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords, behind closed doors, there is a growing worry that Israel’s actions are creating as much regional instability as Iran’s.
This indiscriminate campaign is not only turning populations against them, but also planting the seeds for radicalization and allowing organizations like Hamas to recruit more members in the future.
Regarding the interests of Israel and the US, your articles suggest a lack of clarity concerning the ultimate objectives of their joint operations. You’ve noted a divergence in goals: while the Trump administration appears focused on a ‘Venezuela-style’ model of maximum pressure, the Israeli side prioritizes military incapacitation and the disruption of nuclear capabilities. Despite these different approaches, both seek to install a new regime in Tehran that aligns with their interests. Based on your assessment, how likely is it that the US could successfully facilitate such a regime change?
I don’t know if the Israelis have that goal or can conceive of it. Their attempt to support a congenial leader in Lebanon during the civil war ended in assassination and a 20-year occupation. We are seeing history repeat itself with Israel sending ground forces into Lebanon again.
The Venezuela model was much more on President Trump’s mind. He successfully decapitated the regime there by capturing Nicolas Maduro and working with the Vice President. I believe this was a very transactional approach focused on oil and mining deals rather than democracy and rights. He wanted to replicate this arrangement in Iran, but Iran responded in a very different way.
Before Maduro was seized in January 2026, the US imposed a blockade and fired on boats suspected of drug trafficking. In Iran, however, a successor to the Supreme Leader was quickly appointed. The Iranians continued to retaliate, closed the Strait of Hormuz, and inflicted a cost on the United States that Venezuela did not.
Since President Trump was unable to bring about capitulation through military action, he is now trying a blockade. He did something similar with Cuba after taking out Maduro. However, the Iranians are responding with extreme resistance. The message they have sent since the war started is that for every action, there will be an asymmetric equal and opposite reaction. When the US seizes a tanker, Iran seizes one. They are resisting any designs to replicate the model used in Venezuela.
Let’s turn to the Iranian population, specifically those who have been protesting for regime change. Early in the conflict, President Trump and Israeli officials urged Iranians to ‘take back their country,’ and videos surfaced showing some groups thanking the US and Israel for their military operations. Given the current state of the war, where do those voices stand today, and what internal scenarios do you see emerging next?
I think those voices are divided. Before this war, there were Iranians hoping the US would take military action against their regime, and I think there are still those who believe if they keep pushing, eventually there will be change. Others have changed their opinion, seeing that this has actually made the situation worse for ordinary Iranians; that the regime has become more hardline, militarized, and securitized. It is even less tolerant of domestic dissent. We are seeing crackdowns happening during the war; even if most of the attention is on the war, the regime is cracking down on domestic dissent.
This is even apparent at the top level. The Supreme Leader’s son, who took over, is apparently struggling. He was hit in the attack on his father and is struggling with his health, so he has not appeared publicly. However, he apparently has a close relationship with the military and the security apparatus, even more so than his father. This shows increased consolidation of the IRGC, the security, and the military within the system. This will be problematic for Iranians who want change and for Iranian activists inside the country.
On a broader level, the war has made the situation objectively worse for Iranians, even if some may still support military intervention against the regime. Whereas they were previously dealing with international and economic sanctions, they are now dealing with daily bombardments by the Americans and Israelis. These bombardments target not just military sites but also civilian ones.
With over 3,000 people losing their lives in Iran—including both combatants and civilians—civilian infrastructure is increasingly being targeted. Over time, Iranians are seeing the detriments of this war to their own security and stability. They are now being increasingly squeezed economically, not just by sanctions, but also by an American blockade in the Persian Gulf. Before the war, Iranians were already dealing with major economic adversity in the form of record currency devaluation and high inflation. Those problems have presumably worsened along with the blockade.
While the elites can ride this out somewhat because they have resources, monopolies, and smuggling networks, it is the average Iranians—particularly low and middle-income individuals—who disproportionately suffer. There is also a credibility issue. During the protests in January, when thousands lost their lives, President Trump said help was on the way. In the end, no US help arrived, which caused many Iranian activists and citizens to be disillusioned and disappointed with the United States.
With this war, some may still support military intervention, believing it is the only way to achieve regime change.
There may still be a large number, including opposition leader Reza Pahlavi in Maryland, who see military action as a path to regime change. However, I think those scenarios are far-fetched wishful thinking right now.
We have seen regimes like the Assad regime in Syria fall very quickly in December 2024, but Iran does not seem to have strong opposition leaders or a uniform front capable of challenging the regime. There is a consensus that the regime maintains the advantage in terms of coercive capacity. When leaders like Trump and Netanyahu tell the Iranian people to rise up, the people lack the capacity to challenge the regime on those terms. Peaceful protests and strikes have only brought more repression, death, and detention.
The situation is bleak. The regime remains intact, highly authoritarian, and repressive. Economic and military pressure from the United States and Israel disproportionately impacts civilians, even as senior officials are assassinated. The Iranian economy is in shambles. Even if there is a cessation of hostilities, Iranians face a massive reconstruction process that could cost billions of dollars and take a lot of time.
As a result, given the suboptimal economic and security outcomes, others are having second thoughts. Iranians are in a hopeless situation, feeling sentiments of “doom and gloom.” They feel caught between a highly authoritarian and repressive regime on one side and economic sanctions and military escalation by the Americans and Israelis on the other.
The Iranians have gone through a very difficult year with two wars in less than a year, deadly crackdowns on protests in December and January, and an environmental crisis where cities like Tehran are running out of drinking water. The regime’s priority is to survive at all costs, even at the expense of its own population. I do not see a clear way out for the average Iranian right now.
What advice would you offer developing nations, such as Ethiopia and others in Africa and elsewhere, on navigating this period of intense diplomatic turbulence while safeguarding their own national interests?
African states have traditionally hedged between superpowers like China and the United States. Relations with the Middle East have become more complicated as Israel, Iran, Turkey, and the Arab Gulf states play a more assertive role in the Horn of Africa.
It would serve these states best to continue maintaining that hedging strategy. Taking sides could have negative ramifications moving forward. We saw this during the Yemeni civil war when some Horn of Africa states temporarily distanced themselves from Iran to partner with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, only to re-engage with Iran later. Even if certain actors take sides to galvanize constituents, those positions are transactional and likely temporary. We will likely see a reversion back to the hedging seen in the past.
