Tegegnework Gettu (PhD) is a development economist by training whose career has climbed to the pinnacle of global diplomacy. Before ending his long and illustrious career with the United Nations, Tegengework held the office of Under-Secretary-General—the third-highest ranking official in the UN hierarchy. His distinguished tenor has seen him in other high-level leadership roles, notably as Director of the UN Development Programme in Africa. With extensive firsthand experience in global diplomacy, he has worked alongside some of the world’s most prominent leaders.
Since retiring from the UN and returning to Ethiopia, Tegegnework has held several influential positions as a board member and chairperson of major state-owned enterprises. He served as the Board Chairperson of the Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) and the Liability and Asset Management Corporation (LAMC), an entity established to manage state-owned enterprise debt. Currently, he serves as the sole independent board member of the nation’s sovereign wealth fund, Ethiopian Investment Holdings (EIH).
Before he resigned last year, Tegegnework spent three years as a commissioner for the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission. His global experience, marked by high-level diplomacy and strategic leadership, offers a unique lens through which to view Ethiopia’s internal and external fractures.
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The Reporter’s Bewket Abebe sat down with him to discuss a range of pressing national and international matters. EXCERPTS:
The Reporter Magazine: You lived and worked in the United States for over 30 years, primarily within UN agencies. Is it true that you never changed your citizenship?
Tegegnework Gettu(PhD): Yes, that is true. I lived in the U.S. for 35 years. After completing my undergraduate degree at Addis Ababa University, I earned two master’s degrees and a PhD there, thanks to Columbia University and Ford Foundation for providing me with a full scholarship during my studies. I taught at universities and worked for the UN for most of my time. However, I did all of this as an Ethiopian citizen; I never held a green card nor obtained US citizenship, and the same applies to my wife.
People often pursue every possible avenue to gain US citizenship, yet you had the opportunity to secure it effortlessly. Was there a specific reason you preferred to retain your Ethiopian passport?
At the time, securing US citizenship was not difficult for those working at the UN. If you worked there for seven years, the law used to provide an opportunity to secure a green card and, eventually, citizenship. We simply did not need it. I had no reason to change my citizenship; my country has given me all that I needed. I grew up very well and lived well. Growing up, my parents and the community provided a good life and education for me. I grew up as a proud Ethiopian. My parents raised me to have a deep love for my country. When my wife and I decided to return to Ethiopia, we did so to be closer to our parents and to enjoy the remainder of our lives in our home country.
You spearheaded a personal initiative to campaign in support of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), particularly regarding diplomatic outreach. While the GERD stands today as a completed, historic achievement, diplomatic tensions remain elevated, largely due to continued pressure from downstream nations. Following the pattern of his previous term, the US administration under President Trump intervened with controversial commentary, offering a “mediation” role that many observers view as clearly biased. Given your expertise in the dynamics of global power, what inherent risks do you identify when “Great Power” mediation supplants a multilateral or regional process, such as that of the African Union?
We must analyze this matter layer by layer. Fundamentally, as long as Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Abay (Nile) exist, contention over the river will persist, regardless of the GERD’s completion. Egypt has actively formulated and executed strategies aimed at monopolizing the Nile at the expense of Ethiopia’s interests. Due to our internal weaknesses, we long treated this matter with excessive patience. At one point, they entertained ideas of cutting through northern Ethiopia via Assab and merging with Sudan to secure total control over the Nile. They have also attempted to mobilize downstream nations, such as Congo and Burundi. Now, however, the time has come for us to utilize our natural resources for our development without causing harm to downstream countries.
Regarding the stance of the United States, it is instructive to note that the U.S. whose president is currently tilted towards Egypt was once the same entity that provided intensive research on the Nile Valley and developed key plans for water utilization during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie. This simply illustrates how global alliances shift dramatically over time. It is incumbent upon us to acknowledge this reality and prepare accordingly for the short, medium, and long term. Egyptians are campaigning and lobbying the US to put pressure on Ethiopia to promote their interest. The US will always act primarily based on its national interest. The dispute over the Nile will be perennial and alliances change with time.
We also need to closely monitor Egyptian activities beyond the GERD. For instance, in eastern Egypt, they have constructed massive flood irrigation systems utilizing UAE funding—securing USD 10 billion for that project a few years ago. Furthermore, they have implemented a project diverting the natural flow of the Nile to Sharm el-Sheikh and are attempting to construct another large city relying on the river. We must anticipate such upstream developments and plan accordingly.
I do not see what the Egyptians will gain by deepening controversy over the dam or the Nile water. At the heart of the matter is Ethiopia provides 86 percent of the water, and Ethiopia intends to use part of it without denying Egypt its fair share of the water. We know the livelihood of Egypt depends on the Nile. But at the same time Egypt contributes no water to the Nile but takes the lion’s share. The Egyptians, rather than being engaged in subversive activities and fanning conflict in the Horn, should closely work with Ethiopia in joint hydro power energy and agro industrial development in the entire Nile valley. They should also work together with Ethiopia preventing waste of water, regulating the flow, and cooperating in storing surplus water where evaporation is minimal. This will provide a great opportunity for both.
The GERD issue is a fait accompli just like the Aswan Dam. I do not see what they can possibly do to alter this, be it through force or diplomacy. Their focus now, as I perceive it, will likely shift toward asking for guarantees that Ethiopia does not construct other projects on tributaries that feed the Nile. They are keenly aware of Ethiopia’s growing demand to utilize its water resources for various purposes. Consequently, they aim to strengthen their bargaining position and secure a binding agreement.
The water of the Nile constitutes one of Ethiopia’s greatest assets for development. Rather than expending huge resources to undercut and destabilize Ethiopia, Egypt will be better off thinking about joint development which will be mutually beneficial.
In my view, President Trump’s inclination towards Egypt is simply a tactical bargaining maneuver without knowing much about the complexity. We should not forget the active lobbying and misinformation by Egyptians to put pressure on Ethiopia through the US in return for the service Egypt provides to the US in the Middle East. To understand this, one must go back to the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War and the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty following the war. After the peace treaty, Egypt withdrew from the radical alliance with Syria and Iraq that formed the “United Arab Republic” and had closer relations with the US. The US has rewarded Egypt with USD 1.3 billion in military and economic assistance since the Egyptian- Israeli peace agreement. The unity of the radical Arab States against Israel was progressively dismantled and Egyptian influence in the Middle East progressively gave way to wealthy Arab countries including Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar. As a result, Egypt’s traditional geopolitical importance is progressively diminishing.
Therefore, it is up to us to comprehend the scenario and navigate wisely, and act accordingly by not overlooking that the Egyptians are highly adept lobbyist negotiators and maneuverers using extensive misinformation. They have gone to the extent of providing bribes to Senator Mendez and attempting to influence elections in the US. Therefore, the current tilt of the American presidency towards Egypt and his stated desire to mediate once more should carefully be handled under the above context and in sophisticated multi-channel.
Egypt also attempted to involve the UN in the dispute over the GERD; however, this initiative failed because they lacked logical reasoning and legal standing. The Egyptian legal argument is their “Exclusive Right” founded on precedence that Egypt has always used the water without restriction and the principle of the historical right based on colonial agreement, which does not hold water.
The solution for Ethiopia is simply to stand firm and strong. Cultivating internal unity on national interests is a crucial assignment at home, and as well as expressing willingness to cooperate with Egypt on joint development programs when they are ready to cooperate. We need to always be prepared for any mediation effort at any time without fundamentally compromising Ethiopians’ national interest.
Reflecting on the increasing rhetoric of “might makes right” replacing the rule of law internationally, coupled with unilateral actions by superpowers, such as the U.S. intervention in Venezuela, many observers contend these trends signal the gradual death of the United Nations. Having served in various capacities within the UN for nearly half your life, what is your assessment of this situation?
It is necessary to disaggregate the different entities within the UN system. The system comprises approximately 39 sub-organization, including principal organs, such as the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council, as well as major affiliated funds, programs (e.g., UNICEF, UNDP, WFP), and specialized agencies like the WHO.
So, when assertions are made that the UN is weakening and becoming powerless, which entity is being referred to? This description most accurately fits the Secretariat even if others are also weakened to a lesser extent. The declining efficacy of the Secretariat is manifested in two ways: its progressively weakening leadership and the approach adopted by member states. During his first term, President Trump clearly stated that he did not “give a damn about the UN.” The UN should have confronted this reality at that time. I was working within the UN Secretariat as Under-Secretary-General when he explicitly made it clear that he only cares about the United States’ national interests. During the tenures of secretary-generals such as Kurt Waldheim, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan, as well as Mallock Brown, the UN used to take proactive measures to mitigate and minimize damage.
Things are different now. Among other geopolitical reasons, I believe we currently have weak leadership marginalized by US actions and a Secretary-General lacking the fortitude to say “no” and confront such actions.
Furthermore, an unpleasant reality within the UN system is that veto-holding powers such as the US possess the leverage to overrule the collective voice of the other 193 countries. As the rules-based approach to international affairs is compromised globally, the authority of the UN undoubtedly deteriorates.
Initiatives like the recent Board of Peace operate outside the formal UN structure and serve as a clear message to the General Assembly and its Secretary-General that they are becoming irrelevant. The Canadian Prime Minister described this current situation as a “rupture,” and it is indeed a rupture. This is evident in Ukraine, Gaza, and Venezuela.
So, what should be done under such circumstances? First, continue cooperation with peace loving countries. Keep on adjusting to the changing international order. Much as we did during the fascist occupation in the past, we must prepare to protect our sovereignty and national interests. In doing so, it is important to first address internal challenges to our unity, build a strong military, and ensure rapid, consistent economic growth. Furthermore, it is essential to ensure that citizens benefit equitably from the nation’s progress. Specifically, advancing agriculture and improving the livelihoods of farmers, who account for as much as 80 percent of the population, remains very important. We must safeguard ourselves while maintaining our positive contributions to the UN system, such as our highly reputable peacekeeping missions.
Despite government reports of macroeconomic success—projecting GDP growth as high as 10.2 percent and citing breakthroughs in agricultural productivity such as wheat, the 2025 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Report ranks Ethiopia 145th out of 167 countries. It highlights a ‘development emergency’ where performance in education and health has deteriorated. As a development economist and someone who played a key role in leading the UNDP during the inception of the SDGs, how do you reconcile these diverging reports?
Economic development is a cumulative, long-term process. First it is important to recognize progress made. The index you mentioned incorporates various variables that are often disadvantageous for developing countries like Ethiopia. Generally, the government paints a positive picture to claim success, while opposition forces focus on failures to portray the government negatively. Neither perspective accurately reflects the true nature of development, which requires a holistic and sustainable approach.
We have to distinguish between the standard measurements used by Bretton Woods institutions and governments such as GDP, inflation, balance of payment, fiscal and monetary indicators, tax and tariff policies, debt e.t.c. against those used by institutions like UNDP and UNICEF such as the human development index, life expectancy, year of schooling, inequality, gender development, multi-dimensional poverty index, quality of health and education e.t.c.
These two kinds of measurement support one another and progressively improve the way we measure development. They reinforce one another. Therefore, you should look at them in that context. But ranking Ethiopia below Djibouti, Malawi and Lesotho or Nigeria below Comoros, Papua New Guinea by human development index does not reflect the actual economic reality, power and strength.
For me, rural development remains the key. The majority of our population lives in rural areas, and we have an abundance of natural resources. The Mereb, Tekeze, Abay and Baro zone; and the Awash, Gibe, and rift valley lake zone; and the Shebelle-Genale Zone all of them with no less than 30 smaller rivers no less than 30 lakes with agro-industrial development could feed the entire Africa and the Middle east as well as help earn the necessary foreign exchange for industrialization as long as conflict and ethnic tensions are resolved.
Ethiopia is geographically positioned to supply the Middle East which is a massive market that currently imports agricultural goods from as far away as Australia and New Zealand. We could deliver these same products in a 40-minute flight. Think about it.
Freeing our rural households from unrelenting daily grind of painful manual labor, household drudgery, darkness, isolation, lack of roads and transportation, of public water works, modern medical treatments, flushing toilets, heating for cooking, mechanical refrigerators, electricity, telephones, and water and sewer provisions must be our priorities.
Is there hope that Ethiopia will achieve the SDGs in the remaining four years?
These goals are not achieved overnight. No country reaches them in such a short timeframe. While I am not justifying our delay, to fully force on development we must address our ongoing conflicts immediately. These challenges are not unsolvable. Nothing is impossible when sustainable development is the priority. However, the chances of Ethiopia advancing in economic development growth are only possible if we simultaneously achieve peace and stability. With hard work and wise policy, Ethiopia can easily be an economic giant.
The recent history of the Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) has been marked by systemic failures—ranging from disastrous commercial farm loans in Gambella to high-profile defaults on Turkish investments. Indeed, the bank reached a crisis point where Parliament debated whether the institution should be dissolved entirely. However, under the presidency of Yohannes Ayalew (PhD) and your board chairmanship, the DBE saw a remarkable turnaround, particularly in reducing NPLs and returning to profitability. And most recently, a leadership crisis has brought its name once more to the headlines. Having been part of the bank, what do you believe remains its most fundamental challenge?
Yes, DBE was experiencing difficulties. Yohannes was previously a board member, and we suggested he led the bank as president. The macro group—the macroeconomic committee consisting of the finance minister and other high-level officials— supported us and backed our bold moves. We proved to be firm in ensuring clients repaid their loans. We also incentivized the staff, which proved productive; we developed a strategic plan and implemented it. The bank became liquid and reported a substantial profit, conducting internal reform. We were very transparent and activities were well documented as well as audited. I am grateful for the staff and management support. I haven’t kept up with its current state since I don’t know what transpired after I left and therefore, I cannot speak to that.
As a board member of Ethiopian Investment Holdings, you oversee a portfolio of 40 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under the sovereign wealth fund that account for a significant share of the nation’s assets. What measurable improvements have you seen in their competitiveness and operational efficiency?
I don’t speak on behalf of EIH. This is my personal view. The role of EIH is clearly defined in its establishment proclamation. When EIH was established, a significant number of the SOEs were loss-making and not managed well. A primary objective was to help them become efficient and profitable by promoting a profit-oriented and development-focused approach. Another aim is to maintain the strength and profitability of those that were already doing well, such as Ethiopian Airlines, and privatize those with less promise. Furthermore, EIH worked to ensure efficient management within these companies and attract innovative foreign investment to partner with them.
EIH has made significant progress in this regard; introducing state of the art management systems, auditing and correcting many irregularities within these enterprises and taking bold measures across different sectors. EIH has proved itself to be a transparent and well-organized entity with a promising future. It has achieved strong performance across financial, operational and investment areas. We receive detailed, timely, and compressive reports.
A recent IMF report highlighted financial disclosure failures at EIH under what it classifies as a “structural benchmark.” How is the board addressing this lack of transparency?
Again, I cannot speak on behalf of the board. As far as I am concerned, I don’t see any transparency issues here. This is a sovereign wealth fund managing Ethiopian enterprises. The IMF sometimes overreaches if you allow it to do so; the IMF is not infallible, and it has its own members with veto powers to represent, and is dominated by the G7. This should not be the IMF’s business.
Was it not the IMF that backed the ‘Homegrown Economic Reform’?
Yes, it is. That does not mean there are no areas where Ethiopia might not find it necessary to be included in IMF negotiations.
Developing countries like Ethiopia should not be submissive but tactical and work closely with the IMF with sound national technical staff.
Institutions like EIH and DBE are independent institutions, just like the Chinese, French, and Brazilian development banks, as well as the sovereign wealth funds of Qatar, UAE, and others, which I believe are not and should not be subjected to IMF negotiation. As to the issue of financial disclosure, board members have received total and transparent financial reports and disclosure as well as audit reports.
Let’s take the case of the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, for example. It was in serious trouble, as officially confirmed by the Prime Minister at the time, and needed the intervention of the World Bank to save it. Various reforms in the financial sector have, in one way or another, been tied to IMF preconditions. In this case, how do you substantiate your claim of non-interference by such institutions?
Embracing flexibility to secure your national interests and not including institutions that are not subjected to IMF conditionality are two different things. You have to be flexible in certain areas. It is imperative that developing nations manage their relations with these institutions wisely, as it ultimately comes down to bargaining. You cannot afford to be timid. The situations in Nigeria and Kenya illustrate that this is not a textbook scenario.
The way I understand it, If I am not mistaken, Ethiopia’s negotiation revolves around four main issues that the nation has faced since 2019. Severe foreign exchange shortage, high inflation, external date stress, and war-related strains. Therefore, the government entered into a negotiation with the IMF to stabilize macro-economic fundamentals and unlock broader financing. This is more about addressing macro-economic issues and external balance repair. The core objective of Ethiopia’s IMF strategy, the way I see it is for foreign exchange stabilization; debt restructuring; fiscal discipline; revenue mobilization; and monetary and central bank reform.
The whole process revolves around unlocking financing, exchange rate realignment and debt relief acceleration via Paris Club, China, and Eurobond issues. While the current IMF supported program is good for stabilization, it is not sufficient for the overall economic transformation which the government is trying to do. However, the program has stabilized the macro framework, supported debt restructuring, and restored basic confidence.
In my opinion, what makes the current Ethiopia IMF program successful is avoiding shock therapy to the best of our ability, and the implementation of gradual foreign exchange liberalization. Strong social protection measures and parallel export strategy with gold transparency, logistic reform, export value addition, and state-owned enterprise reform and strategic privatization is what I observe happening.
During your tenure as one of the 11 commissioners of the Ethiopian National Dialogue, you traveled across various regions to gather agenda items from the public. How would you summarize the core grievances and aspirations you encountered? To what extent do you believe the items collected so far represent the most fundamental questions facing the nation today?
Traveling to nine regional states and meeting the people, I witnessed firsthand the patience, farsightedness, and wisdom of Ethiopians from one end of the country to the other. The agenda items many forwarded were not limited to their localities; instead, they had a national tone. Another thing I learned is that major concerns are shared by people in different parts of the country with varied ethnic and religious backgrounds. Even their local agenda items take the national interests of the country very seriously. Furthermore, I personally observed how articulate these people were when it comes to addressing issues.
During our discussions in Bonga, people expressed concern about the issues in Tigray. Likewise, during our discussions in the Ogaden, they were worried about the conflicts in the Amhara and Oromia regions. That is what I observed. The Ethiopians I met in Jigjiga, Bonga, Gojjam, Mizan, and elsewhere in the regions we visited shared many common agendas.
Criticism from individual citizens and certain political groups, specifically skepticism over whether the national dialogue is a sincere effort to achieve genuine reconciliation, has been common. Some critics even argue the Commission was essentially “dead on arrival.” How do you respond to those who do not take the process seriously for this reason, and how did you address that skepticism during your time as Commissioner? What aspects of the Commission’s work do you think these critics are overlooking?
First, people have the right to criticize. What I know from my three-year tenure is that the process was very transparent and participatory. I travelled to nine regions and witnessed public participation. I do not agree with the negative tone.
I’ve witnessed open and participatory discussions at all levels of society. The recommendations and input gathered from the people can be used substantively for solutions. It is advisable that we give it a shot for the sake of the people and our beloved country. For your information, all meetings and discussions are documented, filmed and minutes taken and signed.
You resigned from your role as commissioner. Why did you resign at that specific time?
I finished my first term, and I resigned due to a health problem. I had a major surgery that required time and follow up. That is all.
There were comments suggesting that you resigned because you were unhappy about the way things are done there. What is your take on that?
That is simply not true. I am incredibly proud of the work we accomplished during my tenure, and I believe and hope that dedication continues today. Furthermore, I want to be clear: despite rumors of external pressure on the commissioners, I was never influenced or pressured by anyone during my time in office. Comments should be factual as opposed to speculative and untrue. False assumptions and assertions can bring legal accountability.
Do you believe all grievances, which if unaddressed will continue to destabilize the nation, were included among the agenda items you gathered?
I cannot speak with absolute certainty, but I am confident that the major questions facing Ethiopia were represented. The process was bottom-up; we gathered voices from the grassroots up, which are meant to be synthesized into the final agenda.
With armed groups holding significant influence in Oromia and Amhara, and with Tigray facing exclusion as a region, many believe the Commission is doomed to fail unless it engages these groups directly. How do you respond to this?
It would have been better if those groups directly participated. My understanding is that the venue is still open. However, even if they did not attend the meetings directly, their agendas were voiced through the participants. For instance, in Shashamane and Bahir Dar, the militants’ positions were clearly articulated by the citizens attending the meetings. The challenge is not the agenda items themselves, but how we approach them and address them in the final dialogue.
We must make every effort to avoid conflict. Our history is a testament to the destruction of persistent conflict. At 70 years old, I cannot recall a single decade in my life when Ethiopia was entirely at peace. Ogaden, Eritrea, Tigray, Bale e.t.c have gone through wars. We cannot advance this way. We must strive to avoid conflict, and the government must play a magnanimous role in making that happen. As for whether the Commission will deliver, let’s hold our judgment and give it a fair chance. Being intensely skeptical about everything helps no one.
