For many Ethiopians, the completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)—capping a 14-year construction journey—was expected to signal the end of the “hydro-politics” war. With the dam finalized, the era of countering Egyptian diplomatic pressure was supposed to close. Instead, that pressure has returned to center stage, fueled by a renewed “mediation” initiative from a familiar and unpredictable source: Donald Trump.
Despite the dam’s completion, Egyptian politicians continue to treat the dam as a primary point of contention, and President Trump has recently returned the dispute to the global stage with a push for renewed negotiations over water use.
Meanwhile, to the immediate west of the dam, Sudan’s warring factions remain divided on regional diplomacy. The Al-Burhan government backs Egypt and welcomes President Trump’s mediation efforts, whereas the RSF led-coalition is signaling a different alignment— notably, evidenced by their public support for the GERD inauguration.
The controversial and unpredictable leader of the world’s most powerful nation has remained consistent in his rhetoric regarding the GERD: a blend of intimidation, factual inaccuracies, and a pronounced pro-Egypt bias.
Despite a “neutral” foreign policy claiming the U.S. would not interfere in the internal affairs of other nations—unless they ‘threaten the U.S. national interests’—the President has once again drawn the U.S. into this regional dispute.
Initially positioning himself as a master dealmaker, the President began “mediating” between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan by tasking the U.S. Treasury Department, rather than the State Department, to lead the talks. However, this diplomatic effort soon ignited a firestorm following his infamous statement that Egypt would “blow up that dam,” a comment Ethiopia condemned as belligerent.
Throughout both his first and second terms, President Trump has consistently claimed that the U.S. “funded the dam” and did so “stupidly.” Furthermore, he frequently echoes the rhetoric of Egyptian politicians, claiming the dam “threatens” Egypt’s existence—a claim Ethiopia has repeatedly debunked with technical evidence.
Nevertheless, the President continues to insist, “It’s a very dangerous situation because Egypt is not going to be able to live that way.”
Obsessed with taking credit for “averting global conflict”, he recently claimed to have prevented seven wars, including “the one between Egypt and Ethiopia.” Now, he has returned with a more demanding agenda that aligns with his administration’s interests. His recent “offer to mediate” is now being linked to his management of the Gaza crisis.
This time, it is not merely a matter of personality; the strategic interests of the United States are being deeply woven into the volatile hydropolitics of the Nile.
“It is sad to see Trump involve the U.S. (again) in the Ethiopia-Egypt Nile dispute,” says Ambassador Tibor Nagy, the former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, who also served briefly in the State Department during Trump’s second term.
Despite this critique, the veteran diplomat argues that a peace deal between the two nations serves American interests as much as regional ones. Tibor believes U.S. strategic interests could be compromised if the heated dispute escalates further.
Water expert and former GERD negotiator Fekahmed Negash argues that Egypt’s early outreach to the Trump administration was a strategic move to leverage U.S. influence. Following reports that Egypt’s President personally urged intervention during a Washington visit, Fekahmed clarified: “Trump’s statement is a response to that request, not a new initiative.”
A U.S. President who Views the Nile Through an Egyptian Lens
President Trump’s rhetoric regarding the GERD often mirrors Cairo’s political script rather than the neutral tone expected of a global mediator. At Davos, he framed the dam as a “very dangerous issue,” echoing the alarmist narrative that “the water is blocked by a very massive dam.”
Tibor, a critic of this direct involvement, views the administration’s tilt toward Cairo as a reflection of “the weight of Egypt in U.S. interests.” While both nations are important regional partners, Tibor has cautioned Ethiopians against expecting the U.S. to choose between the two, noting that Egypt’s role in Middle Eastern stability—particularly in Gaza—gives it a historical edge in Washington’s strategic calculus.
Despite these challenges, Ethiopia remains an essential U.S. partner. Ethiopia’s importance extends far beyond counterterrorism. From its burgeoning aviation supremacy to its role as a driver of East African economic growth, Ethiopia continues to interest the U.S. as a critical hub for regional stability and trade.
Both Tibor and veteran Ethiopian diplomat Teferra Shawl argue that the U.S.-Ethiopia relationship has evolved far beyond counter-terrorism into a massive economic partnership. The centerpiece of this alliance is Ethiopian Airlines, which supports over 15,000 American jobs through its deep, decades-long partnership with Boeing.
Ethiopian Airlines, the largest airline in Africa and one of the most successful carriers worldwide, currently operates a fleet of approximately 145 aircraft. Roughly 50 percent of these are manufactured by the American aerospace giant, Boeing.
Recently, the airline made headlines by ordering 20 Boeing 737 MAX 8 and 11 Dreamliner aircraft, a deal valued at over USD11 billion USD at list prices. Additionally, Addis Ababa has become the strategic hub for Boeing, which established its African continental headquarters there to strengthen the partnership.
Egypt, on the other hand, has long been one of the United States’ most steadfast allies, serving as a key representative of Arab interests and a regional anchor in Middle Eastern politics. Its unique position as a bridge between Africa and the Middle East makes it indispensable to U.S. foreign policy.
Consequently, Egypt remains one of the largest recipients of American military aid; in the 2026 fiscal budget, the U.S. requested USD1.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to sustain this strategic partnership.
This alliance has become even more critical following the Gaza ceasefire in late 2025. Egypt has positioned itself as the primary administrator for Gaza’s future, leveraging its military and diplomatic weight to stabilize regional “hot zones.” Furthermore, facing a sharp decline in Suez Canal revenues—estimated at USD 800 million per month due to Red Sea instability—Egypt has offered enhanced naval cooperation to secure shipping lanes against Houthi threats. This pivot aligns closely with President Trump’s “America First” economic security goals.
This cooperation was further solidified during the 2026 World Economic Forum in Davos, where Egypt confirmed it would join the “Board of Peace” (a new international organization chaired by Trump to oversee Gaza’s reconstruction).
While acknowledging the U.S. as a strategic partner to Ethiopia, Fekahmed criticized President Trump’s approach.
“Trump’s method is neither diplomatic nor strategic. It’s based on preconditions, threats of sanctions, and increased tariffs—a tactic he has used even with European allies,” he noted. “In reality, Egypt remained largely silent during the Gaza war, opening and closing its border based on U.S. directives. Trump’s position on the Nile is, I think, a favor returned to Egypt.”
Regarding the U.S. balancing its interests between Ethiopia and Egypt, Tibor recently offered a blunt assessment during an exclusive interview with The Reporter Magazine:
“I have told Ethiopians that they should never ask the U.S. to pick between Egypt and Ethiopia because, at the end of the day, Egypt is more important for U.S. foreign policy. That is the reality. I know many Ethiopians will be unhappy with that; for them, Ethiopia is the center of the universe.”
Yet, the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa emphasized that fostering peace between Ethiopia and Egypt ultimately serves long-term U.S. interests as well.
‘Mediation’ by Dictate: What’s New, and What Can it Realistically Achieve?
Ethiopia has been in dispute with Egypt and Sudan throughout the years of the dam’s construction. Despite lengthy negotiations, these efforts have borne no fruit. One such attempt was the U.S.-backed mediation process.
Back then, the Trump administration demonstrated its inability to serve as a neutral broker. The decision to task the Secretary of the Treasury with leading the mediation raised eyebrows—a move that ‘made no sense’ even to the administration’s former Africa envoy.
Another central issue is that the negotiations tend to be merely about satisfying Egypt’s demands. Cairo simply requests to take.
“What is the theme of the negotiations now? Is there really a new negotiation? Negotiation isn’t something you simply fabricate every day,” said Yacob Arsano (PhD), a Nile hydropolitics expert and longtime negotiator.
“They expect us to commit to a binding agreement on their water security. If that is the case, we must ask: what binding commitments is Egypt prepared to make? We need to know what binds them as well,” emphasizes Ambassador Teferra.
This concern is not unique to the diplomat and hydropolitics expert. Ethiopians across various professions—who, in one way or another, follow developments regarding the GERD and regional geopolitics—are asking the exact same question. This inquiry has gained momentum across various platforms ever since President Trump introduced the idea of ‘mediating’ during a press briefing with President El-Sisi at the Davos conference.
Because the negotiations appear centered on Egyptian interests, many Ethiopians are left wondering what, if anything, the process actually offers Ethiopia. It renders the ‘mediation’ a diplomacy by dictate and a ‘negotiation’ in name only.
Teferra concludes: “Flowing in one direction works only for the Nile; it doesn’t work for agreements. Agreements simply don’t function that way.”
“What Ethiopia asks is for Egypt to relinquish its colonial-era claims of sole ownership over the Nile,” said Yacob. Speaking with The Reporter magazine, he added, “They have yet to show any interest in admitting that.”
Addressing the government’s response to Egypt’s demand for a binding agreement, Ethiopia’s Minister of Water and Energy, Eng. Habtamu Itefa (PhD), challenged the narrative of “downstream harm.”
The minister, who declined to comment at this time, argued during an exclusive interview with our Magazine in September 2025 that the burden of transparency should be mutual.
“It is now time for us to closely monitor developments in Egypt,” he noted.
The Minister revealed that he had sent a formal inquiry to his Egyptian counterpart regarding the massive new urban development, Jirian City, which reportedly involves diverting 10 million cubic meters of Nile water daily.
“We, along with other upstream nations, were never notified about this new city. The Blue Nile belongs to all of us,” he noted.
Yacob (PhD) echoes this sentiment, arguing that “Egypt should be held accountable for the unilateral diversion of Nile water out of its basin to the Sinai Peninsula and the Toshka Valley before any future negotiations on the Nile take place.”
Toshka serves as the flagship of the “New Valley Project,” an ambitious initiative to create a second “Nile Valley” in Egypt’s Western Desert, roughly 225 km south of Aswan. As part of this expansion, Egypt recently launched the world’s largest palm farm in the Toshka/East Oweinat area, signaling a long-term commitment to large-scale desert irrigation.
Meanwhile, Tibor warns that the U.S. “needs to be careful” if it wants to remain a credible mediator.
“The U.S. needs to show neutrality and objectivity,’” he advises. “Otherwise, it simply won’t work.”
From ‘Stop the Dam,’ to ‘Pay for Damages’
Egypt has recently shifted its narrative, demanding compensation for alleged reductions in its water share. However, because the GERD was built on the “no-harm” principle toward lower riparian states, Ethiopian experts dismiss these claims as propaganda.
“I have never heard them substantiate their claim of ‘damages’ due to the construction of the GERD,” said Yacob (PhD).
The water minister has stated that Ethiopia is actually quadrupling the minimum flow during the dry season.
“We said the dam is for everyone. They claimed it would hurt them, but we have delivered on our promise,” said Habtamu (PhD).
While Egypt blames Ethiopia for recent flooding, the Minister argues the GERD has actually improved downstream safety by regulating the river’s flow. He explained that the dam reduces flood magnitude and delays the peak by one month—ensuring it arrives only after the White Nile’s peak has passed.
“We are significantly reducing the floods they have historically faced,” the water minister had told The Reporter Magazine, adding pointedly: “I hope that next time they come, they’ll come with a letter of thanks.”
The hydropolitics expert on his part believes Egyptians are mismanaging the water resources they receive from the Nile and should focus on internal improvements rather than claiming that the GERD is affecting them—a claim he argues is unsubstantiated.
“First, they barely use advanced technology; there is no drip or sprinkler irrigation in their crop production. And surprisingly, they forget that the water they mismanage is received from upstream countries,” said Yacob.
The location of Egyptian dams is another example of water mismanagement, according to Yacob.
“They should not have been built in that desert from the beginning, because up to 10 billion cubic meters of water are wasted annually through evaporation,” he stated. “My best advice to President Donald Trump is to get some best American water experts and send them to Egypt to advise the Egyptian government not to mismanage the water they receive from the Nile for free.”
“They have promised to address their extravagance for over 25 years, to my knowledge,” he told The Reporter. “Other nations should not be expected to stall their own development by foregoing dam construction simply to subsidize Egypt’s water mismanagement.”
He noted that between 1993 and 2002, ten separate conferences were held regarding the Nile, where officials repeatedly pledged to resolve these inefficiencies.
Yacob sees no need for new negotiations.
“I would instead suggest pushing Egypt and Sudan to accept the framework they have already been involved in under the CFA,” he stated. “I presume they would re-enter the agreement they once rejected by submitting a formal request to rejoin,” he added.
Why the Dispute Endures
Experts link it primarily to Egypt’s centuries-old mindset regarding control of the Nile. “Building dams on the Nile for national development is far from a new phenomenon; it is a practice spanning over a century, including the High Aswan Dam,” argues Yacob. He maintains there is no historical precedent for a sovereign nation requiring the consent of others to build within its borders.
Veteran diplomat Tefera also believes this claim is deeply rooted and not easily undone from the minds of Egyptian politicians—regardless of facts, technical figures, or ‘no harm’ reasoning.
“We are negotiating not just with Egypt, but with British history and Western interests. That is the reality,” Teferra noted with a touch of sarcasm.
The argument is given credence by a letter written by Trump and addressed to El-Sisi, copied to the PM of Saudi Arabia, president of the UAE, Sudan’s Al-Burhan, and President Taye Atskeselassie and later posted to social media, in which he outlined his plans for US-led talks.
Yacob views the letter as ‘having no theme,’ calling it a breach of diplomatic protocol and inherently disrespectful.
“He CC’ed the letter to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and others, but where are the countries directly involved with the Nile? Kenya, Tanzania, South Sudan, Burundi, and Rwanda were ignored. It is entirely inappropriate,” he said.
Fekahmed speculated that Saudi Arabia’s inclusion was likely at Egypt’s request. He also pointed to shifting alliances in the region: “In the scramble for influence in the Horn of Africa, the once-aligned Saudi Arabia and UAE have soured. They backed opposing sides in Sudan’s conflict, with the UAE supporting the RSF and Saudi Arabia, alongside Egypt, supporting the national forces under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.”
Trump’s letter mentions a possibility for a portion of the electricity generated by GERD being “given, or sold, to Egypt and/or the Sudan.”
The letter fails to mention that Sudan has long been an importer of Ethiopian-generated electricity, and Yacob notes the issue has already been addressed in the 2015 Declaration of Principles (DoP); under the Principle of Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity, which includes a sub-clause on “Providing Priority to Downstream States.”
The agreement establishes the priority of electricity and a mechanism for trade.
It reads: “The three countries shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain optimal utilization and adequate protection of the River Nile. Ethiopia shall give priority to the downstream countries (Egypt and Sudan) to purchase the power generated from the GERD.”
According to Yacob, the conversation should no longer revolve around “rights” to the water, but rather the logistics of the energy market: specifically, the volume of electricity to be traded and the price point.
“That is purely a business deal, not a negotiation over rights,” he said.
Government’s Diplomatic Silence
While Egypt has been vocal in welcoming the renewed U.S. mediation, Addis Ababa is maintaining a “wait-and-see” approach.
Yacob says he remains “unsure” why the Ethiopian government has preferred silence over a proactive response to the “unacceptable moves” being made by others.
“I understand that not everyone has access to the same high-level information as the government, and I trust there is a reason for their silence,” the hydropolitics expert told The Reporter Magazine. “However, in diplomacy, silence can be confusing. It may be interpreted as acceptance or a sign of a positive response. In doing so, you must ensure that this silence does not lead to the compromise of your red lines.”
Speaking to the magazine, the Minister echoed this confidence: “If the [Nile Basin] Commission is realized as soon as possible, they [downstream nations] are the ones who will benefit the most. If it’s delayed, Ethiopia loses nothing.”
Fekahmed further outlined Egypt’s broader strategy to encircle Ethiopia, noting Cairo’s outreach to Sudan, its use of Eritrea’s Assab port, its ties with Djibouti, and its quest for a stronger foothold in Somalia.
“Adding U.S. interference over the Nile to this mix only heightens regional tensions,” he opined.
He recommends that if Ethiopia is faced with an explicit threat, it should refuse negotiations entirely. Otherwise, any talks must be conducted in a manner that strictly protects core Ethiopian national interests.
Diplomacy in a New Legal Era
The strategic path forward for Ethiopia lies in institutionalizing the “equitable use” of the Nile. According to Fekahmed, the most viable option is to ground all future mediation in a comprehensive, basin-wide water-sharing agreement.
By involving all 11 riparian countries through the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), Ethiopia can ensure a multilateral solution. “If that fails,” he suggests as a second line of approach, “negotiations should be narrowed to focus solely on the technical logistics of power generation and sales from the GERD.”
The CFA, which remained stalled for years over the contentious Article 14(b), has finally broken the cycle of colonial-era hegemony. Since its entry into force on October 13, 2024, upstream nations have successfully shifted the regional priority from “historical rights” to modern equity.
This institutional evolution will culminate on February 22, 2026, in South Sudan. On this landmark 20th anniversary of Nile Basin Day, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) will officially hand over its assets and mandate to the newly established Nile River Basin Commission (NRBC).
“The dam is for everyone,” emphasizes the water minister, noting that the six founding members of the Commission continue to wait for Sudan and Egypt with open doors. “Everyone should be incorporated; no one should be left behind. We gave them a nine-month window after the Addis Ababa meeting, and we are still extending that invitation.”
While President Taye Atskeselassie indicated to the UN that the NRBC’s launch is imminent, Habtamu remains pragmatic about the timeline. “The formation may take years,” he told The Reporter, “But the six of us lose nothing if others refuse to join on schedule.”
Ultimately, Ethiopia must pair this institutional progress with a sophisticated diplomatic offensive. Fekahmed advises a rigorous strategic risk analysis to navigate the complex international landscape. By engaging in negotiations under the 1945 UN Charter principles of peace and security, Ethiopia can gain significant leverage—inviting development partners and the UN as observers to witness its commitment to fairness.
Teferra concludes the battle for the Nile will be won on the international stage.
“Ethiopia needs articulate, highly skilled diplomats in Washington to effectively communicate its position, counter opposing narratives, and influence President Trump’s inner circle,” said the veteran diplomat.
By taking this initiative, Ethiopia ensures that the world finally recognizes the GERD not as a source of conflict, but as a catalyst for regional prosperity.
