A new era of ‘transactional diplomacy’ is sweeping through the world, and the volatile Horn of Africa and Red Sea corridor are proving no exception. The old rules no longer seem to apply.
Developments ranging from Israel’s strategic positioning to President Isaias Afwerki’s ‘signaled desire’ to mend fences with Washington. Further, President Trump’s apparent tilt toward Cairo—at the expense of Ethiopia’s interests—appears more pronounced than ever. Amidst this turbulence, PM Abiy Ahmed’s administration has been attempting to diversify Ethiopia’s allies, a strategy often characterized by engaging fierce rivals simultaneously.
In this complex equation of shifting variables, who wins and who loses? What is the likely trajectory of these developments? How far will President Trump go to back Cairo’s interests, and how might his administration’s involvement reshape the Greater Horn and the Red Sea corridor?
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The Reporter Magazine’s Bewket Abebe spoke with Tibor Nagy, the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. A veteran diplomat who served as the U.S. Ambassador to several countries, including Ethiopia, Nagy was also acting Under Secretary of State for Management during the second Trump administration. He is widely recognized for his deep interest in and unique perspective on the region’s diplomatic landscape.EXCERPTS:
The Reporter Magazine: You have consistently advocated for Somaliland’s statehood, pointing to its established state functions. After a three-decade await, self-governing Somaliland received its first formal recognition from Israel last month. What do you make of this development? In your view, how should we interpret Israel’s stepping forward to recognize Somaliland while the rest of the world remains hesitant?
Ambassador Tibor Nagy: Yes, I have been advocating for recognition since I first got to know Somaliland; I am a huge fan. Israel’s move is indeed a significant step forward, though we have yet to see the long-term effects and whether it proves to be a positive development. Israel and Somaliland clearly conducted serious discussions in the background—out of everyone’s sight—and then suddenly came up with this surprise.
Obviously, nations act in their own self-interest. For Somaliland, this move is undoubtedly risky given the sentiments many Islamic countries hold toward Israel; however, both nations have decided that the positives outweigh the negatives. For Israel, it is a way to secure strategic location on the Red Sea. For Somaliland, it opens the door for a UN member state to provide formal recognition for the first time—an act they hope others will follow. Ultimately, this is significant because Israel is ‘recognizing reality,’ and Somaliland is gaining ‘de jure’ legitimacy’ for the first time.
Israel’s move has triggered a wave of diplomatic pushback from various nations through three different international blocs: the African Union, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation—together representing over 100 countries. Meanwhile, others appear to be taking a ‘wait-and-see’ approach, while a few have signaled their support. What do you see coming next?
My prediction is that many countries will ‘wait and see’ what the full ramifications are. However, I am fairly certain that at some point this year, some nations will formally recognize Somaliland while others open semi-diplomatic offices. If you go to Hargeisa, you will see a number of countries already operating there; while these are not official embassies, they perform the same functions. Kenya and Ethiopia are already present, along with several others. Eventually, Somaliland will become a full, de jure member of the international community.
In a recent social media post, you suggested that the United States should follow Israel’s lead in this matter. How likely do you think that is to happen soon? And how would you characterize the current U.S. stance based on your observations?
It depends. Let’s be honest: Washington is split. Some parts of the U.S. government are eager to recognize Somaliland for its strategic value. Others are reluctant due to Mogadishu’s strong opposition and the belief that counterterrorism cooperation with Somalia is currently more important than the potential benefits of recognition. We will have to see how that plays out.
As we all know, we now have a president who exercises very strong control, to say the least. If the White House decides that recognition is the way forward, it will happen. One of the dilemmas is that two influential friends of the U.S. disagree: I am sure the Israelis are advising Washington to recognize Somaliland, but at the same time, President Sisi of Egypt—who wants little to do with Somaliland—is likely advising the White House against it in order to support Mogadishu. We will just have to see how that division is resolved.
Can you specify which U.S. bodies you are referring to and who is on which side?
Those involved in counterterrorism are generally reluctant to support recognition, while those who see Somaliland’s strategic value—not just in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, but in the larger region—would be quite happy to move forward. You can figure out who stands where. I won’t point fingers at specific bodies; that is not a useful thing to do. They should speak for themselves.
What does Israel’s strategic alignment with Hargeisa and its foothold in the region mean for geopolitics?
It is simply a new role for a new player. We know Israel is already heavily involved in the region; for instance, look at Israel’s strikes on the Houthis after they targeted Israel and Red Sea shipping. For Israel, this is a highly strategic position that allows them to observe and influence events directly.
We also know that Israel has strong ties with a number of Arab countries, regardless of whether they have formal recognition. It is obvious that they cooperate on counterterrorism and countering Iranian influence. I don’t want to use the word ‘foothold,’ as Somaliland is a fully independent and sovereign country; I wouldn’t want to make it sound as though they are becoming a semi-colony. However, this move certainly gives Israel a presence right on the shores of the Red Sea. They already have embassies in Addis Ababa and Nairobi, but this is a new and strategic development.
You said it is a ‘risky move.’ What negatives does it have for Israel?
Not really for Israel; I don’t see any real negatives for them. It allows them to influence regional events and, as they say, look ‘straight across’ at the Houthis. Israel tends to act without worrying much about what others think. I don’t think Israel spends ten minutes worrying about how unhappy the AU is—not at all! The AU has its own very peculiar interest in trying to prevent countries from recognizing Somaliland, but Israel simply doesn’t care about that.
Somalia is obviously extremely unhappy because it undercuts their vision of a ‘Greater Somalia,’ but other players in the crowded Horn of Africa will just have to make room for one more. Turkey has been pushing its way in, and now we have a new variable in an already complicated equation. Israel and Turkey are fierce rivals, and President Erdogan likely isn’t happy about this move.
Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki has long been known for blaming the United States for various regional problems. However, in a recent interview with state media, he expressed a somewhat improved view of the U.S. approach, noting that high-level talks are currently underway. Do you foresee a possible alliance between the two in the near future? If so, what kind of impact would it have on the region?
The simple answer is no. We went through this when I was Assistant Secretary for Africa. I visited Asmara, and I thought we had held very positive discussions with Eritrean officials, including President Isaias himself. We proposed a number of potential steps to improve our relations and left with everyone smiling; unfortunately, the Eritreans never followed up.
Like him or hate him, you have to admit that President Isaias has a unique understanding of the region, having personally seen developments and known all of the leaders for decades. But at the end of the day, as Prime Minister Meles Zenawi once told me: ‘You never know what Isaias will do on any given day until he wakes up the next morning and decides for himself.’ That seems to be how it plays out. Consequently, I have absolutely no hope of improving ties between Washington and Asmara.
How about the transition of U.S. foreign policy from a traditional, ideology-based framework to a transactional approach under President Trump’s second administration? Can’t it serve as a catalyst for improving ties between Isaias’s Eritrea and Trump’s United States?
Even with a more transactional Trump administration, you need two partners to dance; you can’t dance by yourself. I mean, you can, but it is not very effective. Eritrea seems afraid to step out of its own shadow. Consequently, I predict the second Trump administration will become just as frustrated with Eritrea as the first one was.
In the 2025 National Security Strategy, the Trump administration argues that previous governments overextended the U.S. global footprint by defining national interests too broadly. The document explicitly states: ‘the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests.’ Given this shift toward strategic realism, what specific activities in the Horn of Africa would the administration likely view as direct threats to U.S. interests?
There will be a few key factors at play, both positive and negative. On the negative side, instability and insecurity tend to foster extremist ideologies—such as al-Shabaab or JNIM—which directly threaten U.S. security. The same is true for the war in Sudan, as it impacts both humanitarian stability and regional security, a point Secretary of State Rubio has emphasized. These issues undeniably impact the U.S.
Viewing Ethiopia through the lens of the current administration’s Strategic Realism, what strategic factors make Ethiopia a relevant partner in the region and which elements make it less relevant to the U.S. interest under this new administration?
There is potential for major deals in investment and trade. Ethiopia, in particular—with its dynamic population and world-leading industries like Ethiopian Airlines—presents tremendous opportunities for U.S. engagement.
The ongoing internal instability in regions like Amhara and Oromia—along with the residual effects of the northern war that impacted Tigray, Amhara, and Afar—makes the country a less attractive partner. While these domestic challenges may not be existential, they continue to hold Ethiopia back. The country is in need of genuine national reconciliation.
What specific U.S. interests are now tied to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)?
The Nile obviously impacts the interests of nine countries in Africa. The key friction is between Egypt and Ethiopia, with Sudan, to a certain extent, caught in the middle. Egypt is a key partner for the U.S. due to its role in the Middle East and the ongoing crisis in Gaza. Meanwhile, Ethiopia plays a key role in the peace and stability of the Greater Horn of Africa.
Peace between Egypt and Ethiopia would be a very positive outcome. A working agreement over the GERD—specifically regarding the release of water rather than the construction of the dam—would remove one of the major destabilizing forces in the region.
Egypt’s reason for supporting Mogadishu and opposing Hargeisa is directly tied to its relationship with Ethiopia. If the two were to reach an agreement, I don’t think Egypt would care much about whether Ethiopia makes a deal with Somaliland.
President Trump has repeatedly exhibited a tilt in favor of Cairo. Even months after the completion of the GERD, he recently announced that he has placed the Nile ‘dispute’ at the top of his agenda. How far do you foresee the President going to side with Cairo and protect its interests?
In the first administration, the U.S. was more favorable toward Egypt. I have told Ethiopians that they should never ask the U.S. to pick between Egypt and Ethiopia because, at the end of the day, Egypt is more important for U.S. foreign policy. That is the reality. I know many Ethiopians will be unhappy with that; for them, Ethiopia is the center of the universe.
However, to be a credible mediator, the U.S. needs to show neutrality and objectivity. Otherwise, it simply won’t work. For example, the U.S. offered to help mediate during the war between the Ethiopian federal government and the TPLF, but it ended up being criticized by both sides. I used to laugh—while also feeling a sense of guilt—at being accused of both supporting ‘TPLF terrorists’ and overseeing a ‘Tigray genocide.’ It is a remarkable position to be in: being held responsible for such conflicting views.
The U.S. needs to be careful. Last time, Trump appointed the Secretary of the Treasury to lead negotiations, which, in my view, made no sense. Hopefully, the Department of State will now take the lead and involve career diplomats.
President Trump is a bit unpredictable. If you agree with this judgment…
[Long laugh] I think that is the understatement of the year so far.
In that case, how far will he go to favor Cairo at the cost of Ethiopia?
President Trump is not going to involve himself personally in these negotiations. An American president’s day is split into ten-minute segments; he spends the majority of his time on domestic issues and only a portion on foreign policy. The most he can do is host Prime Minister Abiy and President Sisi at the White House if they reach an agreement. He would shake their hands, take a nice photograph, and sign a document—that is it.
Ethiopia is increasingly diversifying its global alliances to serve its immediate national interests, particularly through its active membership in the BRICS bloc. This strategy includes elevating ties with China and India, deepening reliance on the UAE as a critical financial benefactor and military supplier, as well as alleged back-channel contact with Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), nuclear and related cooperation with Russia, and an MoU with Iran that includes intelligence sharing. From your previous institutional experience at the State Department and your current observations, how are such approaches by countries like Ethiopia viewed by the U.S. State Department?
Part of the realistic U.S. foreign policy is to accept the fact that every nation acts in its own interest. If Ethiopia’s interest relates to this and that country, then it is up to Ethiopia to go for it. We may not be happy but we accept it unless it crosses what we call a “red line” for our interests. If the US gets overly upset for example with Ethiopia having an intelligence sharing agreement with Iran, that impacts our national interest. At such a point, the U.S. would say: “If you are going to deal with Iran, then we will take our partnership elsewhere.”
The dynamic is changing. It is no secret that the previous US foreign policy has been very hypocritical and patronizing, and young people in Africa see that and call it out. We had to change to a more realistic approach. We had to change. Our job is to present the U.S. as a more attractive partner. I believe the current U.S. administration takes a much more realistic approach to foreign policy.
The U.S. approach to Africa has become defined by friction: stricter visa processing and travel bans, the introduction of new tariffs, and a shift toward transactional ‘America First’ health deals among others. Meanwhile, China has moved to eliminate trade barriers entirely, offering duty-free access to 53 African nations and cementing its role as a primary trade partner. In light of these diverging paths of the U.S. and China, how much ground is Washington losing in the battle for influence on the continent?
I don’t think Washington’s goal anymore is how much influence it’s going to have vis-à-vis China. The goal is exactly what Secretary Rubio articulated: ‘The United States is doing whatever is necessary in any specific place or instance to make America safer, more secure, and more prosperous.’ It’s not about what China is doing; as we just discussed, African nations need to decide for themselves what is in their interest.
Previous U.S. foreign policies, as we have discussed, have been very hypocritical. They said, ‘Africa is the most important thing in the universe,’ but what actually happened? Africa has historically been the lowest geopolitical priority for the United States among the continents. That was all, politely speaking, hogwash.
Finally, we have an administration that looks at things realistically and says, ‘The United States of America is not a charity. We are responsible for taking care of the American population. It is not our responsibility to cure the world’s ills at the expense of the American taxpayer.’
The United States has thousands of charities, and the American people—myself included—can contribute to those that do charitable work. However, that is not the role of the U.S. government; otherwise, some African countries would keep aid in their budgets for the next 200 years. That needed to end. In that regard, the administration did the right thing as far as I am concerned.
Humanitarian aid is different. We respond even to enemies when there are disasters. Recently, when a hurricane hit Cuba, we helped the Cuban people. It depends on what is to our advantage, what is to your advantage, and where those two interests intersect. It is about mutual advantage.
Regarding visas, I have held a strict view since my first tour in Africa in 1978. I saw firsthand how many people say they are coming to visit the United States but end up staying. When I was Ambassador to Ethiopia, I noticed that out of every ten visas we gave to Ethiopian doctors, nine did not return.
I instituted a policy at the embassy of not giving visas to Ethiopian doctors. It was very unpopular among the doctors, but I felt that if a physician is educated at the expense of the Ethiopian people, they should be serving the people of Ethiopia—not the people of Chicago. At one point, we had more Ethiopian ophthalmologists in Chicago than in Addis Ababa.
At the end of the day, it comes down to the export of human capital. We have been bitterly criticized for decades for ‘stealing’ Africa’s human capital; yet, now that we have tightened the visa rules, everyone is criticizing us for that, too. It can’t be both ways.
Those are corrections that I think have been needed for a long time. They lead to a much more honest, open, and equitable relationship—one where Africans and Americans truly look each other in the eye and treat each other as equals and partners. There is no room for patronizing ‘big brother, little brother’ dynamics. We are all in this world equally; we are all God’s children.
Regarding influence, you can exert the most influence by not trying to influence. That may not sound logical, but for decades, America’s global standing was built on our culture, our democracy, our commitment to human rights, and our excellent educational institutions. These opportunities naturally drew people to the United States. I believe this is how our influence will grow—not through propaganda.
I am a huge supporter of ‘soft power’ rather than ‘hard power’; the former emerges naturally from who we are. Fortunately, our people are diverse; America is not based on any one ethnicity, but on a philosophy and an ideal.
I sometimes ask my Chinese friends: ‘In the United States, we have a member of Congress who is Somali-American. When will there ever be a member of the People’s Assembly in China who is Somali-Chinese?’ Their honest answer is ‘Never!’ That says more about the difference between our two systems than thousands of pages of propaganda.
