Addis Ababa, a strong ally of Abu Dhabi, welcomed a delegation from Tehran headed by Iran’s Police Chief, Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan, a mere two days after hosting Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar of Israel, another key actor in regional geopolitics.
In a rare development for security collaboration between Iran and Ethiopia, Iran’s police chief and his Ethiopian counterpart, Commissioner General Demelash Gebremichael, signed a security cooperation accord (a Memorandum of Understanding) in Addis Ababa. The MoU reportedly covers intelligence sharing, combating cross-border crime, and capacity building.
Despite limited official statements and a low public profile—not atypical for agreements like these—some security analysts consider the MoU highly significant, believing it carries a message beyond its stated terms.
A minor agreement is certainly nothing new for these two nations, even in recent years. So what makes this particular MoU so noteworthy? To analysts, the answer is straightforward. They view the implications of the agreement with Iran as wider and more profound, ranging from regional dynamics to Ethiopia’s internal situation.
Professor Eric Lob is a board member of the American Institute of Iranian Studies. He follows developments in Iran’s relations with others, particularly in the Horn of Africa, closely. Offering his insights to The Reporter Magazine, Professor Lob considers the security deal between Addis Ababa and Tehran as “something to keep an eye on with questions in mind”.
Oral Toga, an Ankara-based security analyst specializing on Iran, is another expert weighing in on the topic. He provided his detailed perspective to The Reporter Magazine.
Toga observes the timing of the agreement is crucial.
He notes that it is “happening at a time when Yemen-centered developments have brought Red Sea security back onto the agenda. Iran’s entering into official cooperation with a partner through which it can establish direct land connections with the region is noteworthy.”
Toga observes that while the deal’s public framing appears technical and limited, its timing and symbolism are likely to influence the strategic calculations of regional and international stakeholders.
Lob notes that domestic factors have a significant bearing on the MoU.
“It comes at a time when Abiy’s administration is depleted after the Tigray war, even though they emerged victorious,” said the expert.
Scope of the Security Deal
Beyond the publicly disclosed scope—intelligence sharing, combating cross-border crime, and capacity building—specifics of the MoU signed between Tehran and Addis Ababa, some 3,000 kilometers apart, remain largely unknown. The ambiguity surrounding contexts of key terms has fueled analyst speculation.
Lob attributes this to Iran’s characteristic approach to agreements.
“I do follow MoUs, whether they are military, political, or economic agreements between Iran and other countries in the global south. You see instances where Iran signs a number of agreements with a specific country but it’s very difficult, if not impossible, to access the texts of those MoUs,” he told the Reporter Magazine. “Even in rare instances when you do, they are frequently ambiguous, perhaps intentionally.”
Crucial questions surrounding the MoU between Addis Ababa and Tehran arise: How will ‘cross-border crime’ be interpreted? How are ‘criminals’ defined? And how will individuals and groups within these classifications be securitized? Would such cooperation be directed toward forces in a neighboring country like Eritrea? If so, the implications would certainly create a delicate situation for Iran.
Clear answers to these questions remain elusive from the signing parties. The Reporter Magazine attempted to include perspectives from the Iranian Embassy in Addis Ababa and the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), but these efforts were unsuccessful due to a lack of response from both entities. Nevertheless, analysts do have perspectives to share.
Professor Lob assumes that “ethnic militias that are increasingly challenging Prime Minister Abiy’s authority” will be targeted.
The core implication is that this MoU extends well beyond its publicly announced provisions.
Reinforcing this perspective, a retired Ethiopian diplomat whose career in the foreign service often involved engagements with Iran, told The ReporterMagazine that Tehran typically conducts diplomatic work with minimal public fanfare.
“Their special characteristic is that they do many more jobs under the ” he revealed.
Toga has made a similar observation.
“Iran minimizes visibility while maximizing access and leverage. It is not unusual for Tehran to prioritize behind-the-scenes negotiations, informal understandings and relationships cultivated through ideological or community-based ties,” he said.
Considering patterns, it appears quite likely that the security cooperation between Tehran and Addis Ababa includes the provision of drones to the Abiy Ahmed administration, which has utilized them extensively in domestic conflicts from Tigray to Amhara and Oromia.
Who Stands to Gain What?
Facing isolation, stringent Western sanctions, and navigating rivalries within the Gulf, Tehran has long struggled to establish its desired presence in the Horn of Africa. Establishing a foothold, particularly in Ethiopia, could be a key step in that direction.
During former President Hassan Rouhani’s tenure, Iran primarily focused on the nuclear deal with the US, leading to a largely disengaged approach in Africa. This coincided with the Yemeni civil war and intense pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE to curtail Iran’s influence in the Horn.
The last major official interaction between Iran and Africa happened in 2023, when the late Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi embarked on a small tour of Africa, meeting with leaders in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Uganda.
For Toga, Ethiopia’s strategic importance to Iran’s geopolitical ambitions stems from its proximity to the Red Sea corridor and its diplomatic weight as the host of the African Union. He emphasizes the security cooperation MoU is crucial from Iran’s perspective.
“Ethiopia is a country that hosts the center of the African Union and has high diplomatic and demographic weight. Therefore, from Iran’s perspective, this type of cooperation not only remains limited to bilateral relations but also feeds its visibility and quest for legitimacy on the continent,” said the security analyst.
Professor Lob shed further light on the significant strategic importance of the Horn of Africa, particularly points along the Red Sea where Iran can access proxies like the Houthis in Yemen.
Economic gain, particularly in the defense sector, is another Iranian objective, mirroring its other export ventures. Iran is frequently accused of using its security and military apparatus to strengthen government ties and expand its presence in the Horn of Africa, a point on which all analysts who spoke to The Reporter Magazine agree.
Despite their long-lasting diplomatic engagement, trade relations between Ethiopia and Iran are notably low. About 10 Iranian companies currently operate in Ethiopia across various sectors, with Iran importing agricultural products and exporting petrochemicals. However, military equipment accounts for the dominant share of their trade.
On the Ethiopian government’s part, a notable trend during and after the Tigray war has been its diversification of international partnerships, moving away from reliance on a few key actors. The government has reportedly sourced drones to combat domestic forces, including the TDF, Fano, and OLA (Shene).
The US State Department confirmed last year that Iran breached a UN Security Council resolution by supplying armed drones to Ethiopia in the summer of 2021. Prime Minister Abiy’s administration has consequently been accused of acquiring these drones specifically for internal conflicts.
In an interview with state TV in 2021, when the ongoing Tigray war meant the federal government’s relations with the west were under great strain, Iranian ambassador to Addis Ababa, Samad Ali Lakizadeh, stated that his country “has a lot to offer Ethiopia” and was “ready to deliver,” noting that Iran exports weapons to over 40 countries.
Today, ongoing conflicts mean the administration’s grip remains tenuous outside of Addis Ababa and major urban centers. The Ethiopian government’s use of drones in the fighting has drawn backlash from the US Embassy. Ambassador Ervin Massinga, whose public remarks frequently draw attention, has repeatedly criticized Abiy Ahmed’s administration for the large numbers of civilians killed in drone strikes.
The Weight of History
The relationship between Iran and Ethiopia goes back millennia to the ancient states of Persia and Aksum, and interactions between the two, though largely limited to trade, have generally been positive.
Modern diplomatic ties have their roots in both countries’ bygone imperial eras. During the 1960s, under Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran, the two administrations were close strategic allies.
A retired diplomat, speaking to The Reporter Magazine, described the relationship as “more positive than many think it is.”
“Generally speaking, I can say Iranians have sympathy for Ethiopia,” he said, noting enduring Iranian goodwill toward Ethiopia, and citing Iran’s swift response during the 1987 Ethiopian famine as an example.
“A small delegation visited Ethiopia, and we showed them various sites, including the Bale camp, before they returned to Tehran. Their response was remarkably swift; within two weeks, they mobilized support through their zakat religious platform and promptly sent two full vessels of wheat,” said the former diplomat.
He emphasized the profound value of this aid.
“At the time, we received virtually no assistance from Arab nations, save for some limited help from the Saudi king. What’s more, the Iranians didn’t even publicly announce their support after providing it,” he recounted.
Iran’s embassy in Addis Ababa has been operational since the imperial era, even during a period when Ethiopia did not have a reciprocal diplomatic presence in Tehran.
“They kept their embassy open even at difficult times. They do jobs silently,” said a veteran diplomat in an interview with The Reporter Magazine.
Ethiopia’s relationship with Iran has demonstrated remarkable consistency, even amidst challenging geopolitical landscapes, underscoring their historically complex bond.
Significantly, not only was Ethiopia the first sub-Saharan nation to establish diplomatic relations with Iran in the 1960s, but the relationship withstood considerable pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 2016, urging Horn of Africa countries to disengage from Tehran.
Ethiopia did, however, temporarily close its Tehran embassy in the early 1990s. The diplomat suggested that this decision was made “perhaps, out of fear of problems with the West, along with budgetary constraints.”
The embassy reopened after the EPRDF assumed power.
“The then Foreign Minister, Seyoum Mesfin, did not waste time in initiating the reopening of the embassy in Tehran,” said the diplomat, suggesting a potential connection. “Maybe there had been some relation, a support package, between the two during TPLF’s struggle.”
This enduring historical bond makes the relationship between the two countries particularly resilient. And, effective January 2024, the two countries both came on board a new bloc that aims to counter Western geopolitical prominence, i.e. BRICS+.
Foreign Policy Pragmatism and the New Normal of Growing Transnationalism
Observers widely agree that the security cooperation MoU signed by Addis Ababa and Tehran is no ordinary agreement and warrants serious consideration. The question now arises whether such a diplomatic move should be considered conceptually unusual for nations like Ethiopia.
On the one hand, Addis Ababa’s search for more foreign policy options is largely driven by the perceived unreliability of Western nations, particularly due to shifts and inconsistencies in US foreign policy—a stance experts deem a ‘pragmatic foreign policy approach’.
The veteran diplomat posits that such diplomatic pragmatism is not new for Ethiopia. He pointed to the relationship between Haile Selassie I and US President Dwight Eisenhower as an example.
“His Majesty Emperor Haile Selassie had a very good relationship with President Eisenhower. But when Eisenhower hesitated to offer what the Emperor asked for, the Emperor wasted no time exploring other options. He quickly went to Moscow and China, securing 400 million rubles for the nation’s agricultural development,” he told The Reporter Magazine.
The pragmatism was on display again in 2016, when Ethiopia opted to maintain relations with Iran despite pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Professor Lob observes that in many ways, the latest MoU is nothing out of the ordinary.
“Globally, we are seeing more and more transnationalism. This, of course, applies to the United States as well,” he told TheReporter Magazine. “So, in this case, I don’t think Ethiopia and Iran are acting abnormally by being transactional.”
The veteran diplomat recalled Ethiopia’s historical knack for keeping up ties with Iran, even amid delicate situations.
“I remember being at the Foreign Ministry during the regime change. Americans were taken hostage, and we offered no commentary, just shared the news. That was it. We remained neutral,” he said.
“Even countries that appear to be enemies deal under the carpet. That is the rule of diplomacy,” said the diplomat.
The key, according to him, lies in being able to keep a balance of confidence.
“You don’t have to be entirely affiliated with one bloc. Diplomacy is the art of the impossible.”
A Signal of State Fragility?
Some analysts see Ethiopia’s growing tendency to strengthen relations with nations like Iran as an indication of the weakness of the Ethiopian state.
“It indicates the limited options it has to have to turn to partners like Iran which will of course bring some controversy and even some potential blow back and pressure from adversaries of Iran,” Professor Lob argues.
Iran has a reputation for working favorably with fragile states. Countries such as Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen are worth mentioning in this regard. The African countries with which Iran has close relations happen to be among the top 20 in the Fragile States Index.
Toga identifies three key factors facilitating Iran’s wider presence in the region: weak central governments, the existence of a Muslim or easily Islamized population, and the ability to compete with other rivals.
However, the case of Ethiopia will be a bit different, according to Toga.
“In a country like Ethiopia with a strong institutional identity and deep religious diversity, the effect of such efforts will remain limited. Iran will therefore try to use soft power instruments cautiously, attempting to define the contact sphere narrowly and carefully,” said the security analyst.
He observes that Iran loses position when it ignores local sensitivities and argues a similar imbalance in the relationship developed with Ethiopia could put at risk not only this country but also Iran’s image across Africa in general.
“Tehran is therefore compelled to proceed along a more careful line this time,” said Toga.
Beyond Bilateral: How Regional Powers Read it
Another point that cannot be ignored is the message this sends to other third parties with stakes in the Horn of Africa, and in this particular relationship. Tehran represents an interest group; from Abu Dhabi and Riyadh in the Gulf, to Israel in the Middle East, and the US and others in the West—all are keeping a close eye on the region and this specific relationship. It has obviously become a center of concern.
Iran’s Gulf rivals were actively engaging in the Horn, forging military, economic, and political agreements to the extent that by 2016, every nation in the Horn of Africa except Ethiopia had cut formal diplomatic ties with Iran.
Oral also considers the latest MoU a step toward diplomatic normalization.
“Some tense pages from the past regarding this memorandum should not be overlooked,” he noted, recounting Iran’s alleged attack on the UAE’s embassy in Addis Ababa back in 2021.
Eritrea is another factor in this complex dynamic, according to Professor Lob.
“Iran also had relations with Eritrea. That could be a delicate situation for Iran,” he said. “Will this MoU inadvertently force Iran into a mediating role between Ethiopia and Eritrea, given their escalating tensions? This could present a precarious diplomatic, military, and political predicament for Iran in its efforts to reduce conflicts between these two countries.”
Lob posits Iran’s involvement may even push Asmara to reconsider its role in escalating regional tensions.
Beyond its immediate scope, the Professor suggests the security cooperation deal sends another clear message to the world.
“Should countries like Ethiopia find Washington or other Western powers unreliable, Iran will step in to fill that vacuum, a trend amplified by Africa’s increasing engagement with China and Russia,” he observed.
The geopolitical implications of the new Iran-Ethiopia MoU will undoubtedly be scrutinized by international actors with strategic interests in the Horn of Africa.
Abu Dhabi, a prominent ally of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and a rival to Tehran, stands out.
As the Ankara-based analyst puts it, “Given its long-standing investments in Red Sea ports, infrastructure, and security partnerships across the region. Iran’s recent re-entry into the Ethiopian security domain may be interpreted in Abu Dhabi as a potential challenge to the existing balance.”
“Even if the current agreement poses no direct threat, its symbolic implications may prompt the UAE to recalibrate its posture through increased economic, diplomatic, or security engagement with regional partners,” said Toga.
Western actors, including the United States and European powers, are also poised to meticulously examine the particular security deal.
“Amid ongoing tensions in the Red Sea and Iran’s support for regional proxy forces, the MoU may be viewed as part of a larger effort to expand Tehran’s influence outside of traditional Middle Eastern theaters,” Toga noted.
Israel, a staunch adversary of Iran, is also expected to take a keen interest in the deal.
Ethiopia’s Iranian Tango: A Dance with Risk?
The agreement between Ethiopia and Iran, while offering Ethiopia diversified support and granting the latter a strategic foothold in the Horn of Africa, carries inherent risks. However, these risks are more pronounced for Addis Ababa than for Tehran, warn analysts.
“If any external partner seeks to use its relationship with Ethiopia to pursue objectives that conflict with the interests of others, Addis Ababa may find itself navigating diplomatic friction or even becoming a theater for proxy rivalries,” said Toga.
The reliance on short-term military solutions from Iran, particularly drone and other military supplies, to manage Ethiopia’s internal security crises raises significant long-term concerns for Ethiopians.
Professor Lob warns that the federal government’s temporary fixes for internal problems could inadvertently worsen existing ethnic tensions and spark new grievances among Ethiopia’s diverse population down the line.
“If I had to guess, Prime Minister Abiy is probably thinking in the short-term now; simply about surviving the current security challenges but not the long-term effects. It is a short-sighted way of approaching the issue. But in the long term it could create more grievances among the different ethnic groups in the country,” he cautioned.
