Somaliland, whose independence is not currently formally recognized by any country on earth despite functioning as an independent state for over three decades and maintaining de facto control over its territory, was once an independent state recognized by 35 countries, including major powers such as the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Israel.
That lasted for five days. From June 26 to June 30, 1960, the former British colony existed as an independent state before uniting with the former Italian Trust Territory of Somaliland to form the Somali Republic.
Once again Somaliland declared its independence on May 17, 1991 following the collapse of Somalia’s Siad Barre regime, this time establishing itself as the Republic of Somaliland, whose territory is the same area once covered by the former British Somaliland Protectorate.
A provisional constitution was adopted in February 1997, and after a referendum, a final constitution was established on May 31, 2001. More than two decades later, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that proposes to grant the former a 50-year lease for a military base along Somaliland’s strategic Gulf of Aden coastline, in return for recognition of the latter’s independence. The deal has triggered a fierce dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia.
Ethiopia’s Steps Toward Somaliland Recognition
Despite the MoU being signed nine months ago, it has yet to be formalized into a binding agreement. However, the Somaliland government recently announced that Ethiopia had appointed Teshome Shunde as its ambassador to Somaliland and had elevated its consulate in Hargeisa to an embassy. Ambassador Shunde presented his credentials to Somaliland’s President Muse Bihi, marking a significant diplomatic step.
This move by Ethiopia is seen as a major advancement towards the formal recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. According to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), the establishment of an embassy and the exchange of ambassadors are typically viewed as full diplomatic recognition between states. While Ethiopia has not yet made an explicit formal declaration recognizing Somaliland as a sovereign state, these actions implicitly signal full recognition.
If Ethiopia were to formally recognize Somaliland, it would become the first country to do so this time around. This would be a significant development, as Somaliland has long sought diplomatic recognition from the international community. Ethiopia’s recognition would be a game changer in the region, likely triggering a ripple effect with far-reaching consequences.
One potential outcome, according to some experts, is that other countries might follow Ethiopia’s lead in recognizing Somaliland as an independent state. Among the countries that could consider doing so are the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United Kingdom, Israel, Taiwan, and the United States.
The UAE has been deeply involved in Somaliland’s development and views it as a strategic partner in the region. Through Dubai’s DP World, the UAE has been investing heavily in Somaliland, particularly in Berbera Port. The port is being transformed into a major regional hub for trade and logistics. The UAE has invested in projects such as the construction of a road connecting Berbera to Ethiopia, further facilitating trade between the two countries, as well as the expansion of Berbera Airport.
Moreover, the UAE has established a military base in Berbera, highlighting the strategic importance it places on Somaliland.
For the UAE, Somaliland serves as a crucial outpost in the Horn of Africa. Beyond its infrastructure investments, the UAE has been training Somaliland’s military and police forces. Furthermore, the UAE is developing a free trade zone near Berbera to attract foreign investment.
Somaliland is also vital to the UAE’s geopolitical interests in southern Yemen. The UAE has a strong presence in southern Yemen, where it financially and militarily supports local militias. One of the UAE’s primary partners is the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a secessionist group aiming to establish an independent South Yemen. In addition to its political and military support for the STC, the UAE has significant economic interests in South Yemen, including control of ports, oil and gas fields, and export terminals. To safeguard and expand these interests, the UAE has backed local armed groups, such as the Shabwani Elite Forces and the Hadrami Elite Forces.
Thus, Somaliland is not only important for the UAE’s interests in the Horn of Africa but also critical to its broader strategy in the Gulf of Aden and southern Yemen. In March 2021, the UAE appointed an emissary to Somaliland.
If the UAE were to recognize Somaliland formally, it would likely leverage its considerable financial and diplomatic influence to encourage other countries to follow suit. This would strengthen Somaliland’s position on the global stage and accelerate its quest for international recognition.
Israel was one of the first countries to officially recognize Somaliland when it gained independence from the UK in 1960. In recent years, Somaliland has sought formal diplomatic recognition from Israel, and reports suggest that Israel is interested in renewing ties. However, Somaliland has been cautious about the potential backlash and isolation it might face from Muslim and Arab states if it establishes formal relations with Israel.
In recent years, the geopolitical landscape has shifted significantly. Many Arab and Muslim countries, which previously avoided formal ties with Israel, have begun normalizing relations. With the help of the United States, four Arab/Muslim states—the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan—signed normalization agreements with Israel, formally recognizing the country. These deals, known as the Abraham Accords, marked a significant shift from the decades-old policy of isolation and non-recognition of Israel.
Following these agreements, trade and economic cooperation between Israel and these Arab states, particularly the UAE, has grown significantly. In addition, the US is actively working to normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, with reports suggesting that Saudi Arabia could formally recognize Israel soon as part of a developing deal.
This growing trend of normalization between Israel and Arab states could encourage Somaliland to move forward with formal diplomatic ties with Israel. With Arab and Muslim countries increasingly establishing relations with Israel, Somaliland may feel less isolated in pursuing its own recognition by Israel.
The Gaza war, which erupted on October 7, 2023, has also influenced Israel’s regional strategy. The conflict between Israel and the Houthi group in Yemen has intensified, with the Houthis launching attacks on ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, making maritime routes unsafe and forcing ships to detour thousands of kilometers around the southern tip of Africa. The Houthis have also targeted “Israeli-linked” ships and launched missiles into Israel, to which Israel has responded by bombing the Port of Hodeidah in Yemen.
Given the strategic importance of the Red Sea, Israel may seek closer ties with Somaliland to secure its interests in the region. Somaliland’s location near critical maritime chokepoints could make it a valuable ally for Israel in ensuring the safety of its shipping routes and maintaining a presence in the Red Sea. As a result, this heightened security context may prompt Israel to formally recognize Somaliland as an independent state.
Ethiopia recognizing Somaliland as an independent state could set off a chain reaction, encouraging other countries to follow suit. With the diplomatic and financial backing of the UAE, other African countries and even the African Union might be more inclined to formally recognize Somaliland. The UAE’s growing influence in the region, coupled with its strategic investments in Somaliland, positions it as a key player in shaping Somaliland’s international status.
In the United Kingdom, there is already strong support for Somaliland’s recognition, particularly within conservative circles. Members of the Conservative Party and the Independence Party have expressed interest in recognizing Somaliland. In February 2024, former UK Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson and former UK Attorney General Michael Ellis visited Somaliland and pushed for its formal recognition by the UK. Reportedly, the UK government, including then-Foreign Secretary David Cameron, has been sympathetic to the idea.
The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have also raised security concerns in the UK. These developments may further push the UK and other European states to consider formally recognizing Somaliland, especially as part of a broader effort to secure maritime routes and promote regional stability.
There is significant support for the formal recognition of Somaliland’s independence in the United States, particularly among conservative policymakers. In March 2022, Somaliland President Muse Bihi visited the U.S. and met with American officials and members of Congress.
One of the key advocates for Somaliland’s recognition is the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank. In its Project 2025 document, which is anticipated to serve as a blueprint for a potential second Trump administration, the Heritage Foundation recommends that the U.S. formally recognize Somaliland’s independence. This move is seen as strategic, as it would position Somaliland as a key player in the growing geopolitical competition between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region.
Once Ethiopia officially recognizes Somaliland, it could have significant geopolitical implications. Ethiopia’s recognition, and potentially that of other states, would likely trigger a series of diplomatic and strategic changes in the region. This move could challenge long-standing principles governing African borders, and the consequences would likely extend beyond the Horn of Africa.
The Impact on Colonial Borders in Africa
The borders in Africa, including those in the Horn of Africa, were largely established during European colonialism. When European powers divided the region, they split nations, tribes, and clans across several newly created states. This division created diverse colonies with groups of people who were often placed under the administration of distant capitals. The result has been a lack of national cohesion in many African countries, leading to secessionist and irredentist tendencies across the continent.
In the Horn of Africa, the boundaries of countries like Ethiopia were drawn by colonial powers such as Italy, Britain, and France. This division separated ethnic groups and communities across multiple countries, contributing to long-term instability.
After gaining independence, African states largely adopted a policy of respecting the borders drawn during colonial times. This principle, known as ‘Uti Possidetis’, is enshrined in Article 4 of the African Union Constitutive Act, which calls for the preservation of borders as they existed at the time of independence. The goal of this policy has been to prevent disorder, chaos, and conflict across the continent. African countries have generally followed this principle, fearing that the recognition of secessionist movements could set dangerous precedents.
Although Somaliland was a separate British colony before merging with Somalia, the application of this principle may be complicated by the fact that it voluntarily joined Somalia shortly after gaining independence in 1960. Therefore, recognizing Somaliland’s independence today might be seen as a challenge to the established principle of respecting colonial boundaries.
If Ethiopia proceeds with recognizing Somaliland, it could compromise the long-standing principle of preserving colonial borders. This move might encourage other secessionist movements across Africa and lead to broader geopolitical instability. The recognition of Somaliland could serve as a precedent, prompting other groups to push for independence and potentially leading to a reshaping of the African political landscape.
Recognizing Somaliland could encourage secessionist movements and irredentist claims across the Horn of Africa, fueling instability in the region. There are already existing aspirations for independence in several parts of the Horn, and Somaliland’s recognition could embolden these movements.
In Ethiopia, for example, various regions, including Tigray, Oromia, and the Somali region, have elements advocating for greater autonomy or outright secession. Similar tendencies exist in Sudan, Somalia, and Somaliland itself. The complex ethnic landscape in the Horn of Africa further complicates these dynamics. For instance, Somalis live across Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Somaliland, while Afars inhabit Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Similarly, Tigrayans and Oromos span multiple countries, creating fertile ground for secessionist and irredentist movements.
The recognition of Somaliland might also inspire regions such as Puntland and Jubaland to seek independence from Somalia. These regions already enjoy a degree of autonomy, and Somaliland’s formal recognition could lead them to pursue a similar path.
Historically, Somalia has laid irredentist claims to Ethiopia’s Somali region (Ogaden), aiming to incorporate it into a “Greater Somalia.” If Ethiopia proceeds with recognizing Somaliland, it could provoke retaliation from Somalia, possibly leading to renewed claims over the Somali region of Ethiopia. Somalia could also support secessionist movements within Ethiopia as a form of retaliation. In fact, Somalia’s Foreign Minister Ahmed Moalim Fiqi recently stated that if Ethiopia recognizes Somaliland, Somalia would consider backing Ethiopian rebels, essentially threatening to fuel internal conflicts in Ethiopia.
Historical Context of Tit-for-Tat Secessionist Support
In the 1970s and 1980s, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan engaged in a vicious cycle of supporting secessionist movements to destabilize each other. Somalia backed the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), which sought to secede the Ogaden region from Ethiopia, and the Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF). Somalia also allowed the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) to establish offices and use Somali passports to further their causes.
Ethiopia, in turn, supported the Somali National Movement (SNM) in its fight against the Siad Barre regime, which later led to Somaliland’s declaration of independence. Ethiopia also aided the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, which established the autonomous region of Puntland. Meanwhile, Sudan supported various Ethiopian rebel groups, including the ELF, TPLF, and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). In retaliation, Ethiopia provided heavy support to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which eventually led to the secession of South Sudan.
This cycle of support for rebel groups contributed to the downfall of the Derg regime in Ethiopia and the Siad Barre regime in Somalia. It also led to the fragmentation of Somalia into Somaliland, Puntland, Jubaland, and other entities. Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan similarly contributed to the eventual secession of Eritrea and South Sudan from Sudan.
There is a strong likelihood that this historical pattern of reciprocal support for secessionist movements will reemerge. Somalia may escalate its support for rebel groups in Ethiopia, particularly in regions like the Somali region, Oromia, and Tigray, where there are already existing tensions. This could fuel further instability in Ethiopia.
In response, Ethiopia might encourage independence movements in Puntland and Jubaland, supporting dissatisfied clans and tribes in Somalia to rebel or seek autonomy. This would perpetuate a cycle of proxy conflicts, destabilizing the Horn of Africa further and leading to widespread insecurity.
This reciprocal destabilization between Ethiopia and Somalia could easily spread, drawing in other regional actors and intensifying conflicts across the Horn of Africa. The region could find itself once again entangled in proxy wars, with various factions fighting for independence or control, supported by external powers.
The already volatile situation in the Horn of Africa could be further complicated by the spillover effects of Middle Eastern geopolitics and the encroachment of regional powers. The intensifying rivalry between the US and China is leading to a diminishing presence and influence of both superpowers in the region. As they compete for global dominance, their potential withdrawal could create a vacuum that may be filled by middle-sized powers from the Middle East, including the UAE, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt.
Omar Mahmood, senior analyst for eastern Africa at the International Crisis Group, argues that Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland could break a long-standing barrier since Somaliland declared independence in 1991, as it has not received any prior recognition from other states. However, he questions whether this move would encourage other countries to follow Ethiopia’s lead or if Ethiopia would remain an outlier. The international community’s existing approach has been to encourage a resolution between Somalia and Somaliland first, which recognition from Ethiopia could undermine. Mahmood notes that any such recognition would primarily serve Ethiopia’s interests.
He highlights that the Horn of Africa is unique in having seen colonial boundaries redrawn, particularly with Eritrea and South Sudan’s independence. While the potential for opening a “Pandora’s box” of secessionist movements is often overstated, it could empower other groups with strained relationships with their governments to pursue independence. Yet, they would face significant challenges in obtaining external recognition, as Somaliland has experienced for over three decades.
Mahmood points out that both Eritrea and South Sudan achieved independence only after internal agreements were reached, followed by conflict with their former governments. This context makes it challenging for Somaliland to rely solely on the precedent of these cases.
He also observes that external actors are increasingly involved in the Horn of Africa, which could exacerbate divisions in the region, especially over unresolved disputes like the MoU. This involvement could complicate regional security efforts, such as combating Al-Shabaab in Somalia.
Finally, he predicts that Somalia would respond negatively to Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland, viewing it as a declaration of war and a threat to its territorial integrity. Even if it doesn’t lead to immediate conflict, it may spark proxy battles, with each side supporting internal adversaries. This historical dynamic could distract from long-term progress in the region and endanger security cooperation between Ethiopia and Somalia, potentially creating a vacuum that Al-Shabaab could exploit.
Teresa Nogueira Pinto (PhD), an assistant professor at Universidade Lusófona in Portugal and an African affairs expert for GIS Reports, sees Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland as a turning point for two reasons. First, independence claims depend on the extent to which they are considered (and eventually recognized) by other actors in regional and international domains. While there has been a successful bottom-up process of state-building in Somaliland, this may not be sufficient for de facto independence. Second, Ethiopia is a regional power with significant leverage in the Horn of Africa and beyond. This recognition will likely pave the way for other countries to acknowledge Somaliland’s claims, although stability will remain a key concern.
Pinto emphasizes that the challenges of disintegration and fragmentation must be carefully considered. Such processes threaten the integrity of states, as seen elsewhere. One legacy of colonialism is a map that often does not reflect historical patterns of belonging. Ethiopia has attempted to foster a sense of national belonging through its federalist approach, which has its own vulnerabilities. Similar challenges can be observed in countries like Cameroon, Nigeria, and Angola.
As security challenges increase across Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel regions, Pinto suggests that global powers are likely to adopt a cautious approach. Regionally, recent events may reinforce the rapprochement between Cairo and Mogadishu, as both countries fear Ethiopia’s emergence as a regional hegemon—and no longer fully landlocked—along with an independent Somaliland that could compete with Somalia for resources in both regional and international contexts.
Pinto concludes that Somalia will likely continue to express its discontent, as evidenced by its refusal to allow Ethiopian forces to integrate into the AU Support Mission in Somalia. However, concerns about escalation, along with Turkey’s mediation efforts—although currently inconclusive—are expected to deter more drastic actions, including overt support from Ethiopia for other secessionist movements.
