In July 2024, Turkey hosted crucial talks between Ethiopia and Somalia in Ankara, aiming to resolve the ongoing dispute between the two countries. The Turkish Foreign Minister brought together Ethiopian Foreign Minister Taye Atske-Selassie and Somalia’s Foreign Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi to discuss ways to ease tensions and find a diplomatic solution. The two ministers, however, declined to engage in one-on-one discussions and communicated through Turkish intermediaries.
The much-anticipated talks ended in stalemate. Both nations consented to a second round of negotiations in September 2024, but neither side budged on their entrenched positions. The Somalia Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, in a defiant statement, demanded Ethiopia withdraw from an “illegal MoU” and declared that further talks hinged on Ethiopia renouncing its maritime deal with Somaliland.
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Somalia President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud added fuel to the fire, echoing this sentiment. The President indicated that Ethiopia had initiated the discussions but remained firm on retaining the maritime deal, unwilling to abandon it.
The origins of this diplomatic spat trace back to January 2024, when Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a controversial maritime Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). This tentative agreement grants Ethiopia a 50-year lease for a military base along Somaliland’s Gulf of Aden coastline, in return for recognizing Somaliland’s independence.
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD), addressing a tense Parliament, underscored the vital importance of sea access for landlocked Ethiopia. He justified the MoU with Somaliland as a necessary step after Somalia allegedly refused to negotiate maritime access. Somalia, however, staunchly defends its territorial integrity, with Mohamud insisting that Ethiopia’s sea access should not come at Somalia’s expense. He has also maintained that Somalia has never denied Ethiopia access to the sea.
The contentious maritime deal has also ignited a fierce geopolitical firestorm.
Somalia accuses Ethiopia of violating its sovereignty, with President Mohamud branding Ethiopia a hostile force, an adversary. It also ramped up its military readiness, vowing to prevent Ethiopia from establishing a foothold in Somaliland. In a series of retaliatory moves, Somalia expelled the Ethiopian ambassador from Mogadishu, shuttered the Ethiopian embassy, and ordered the closure of its consular offices in Hargeisa and Garowe. The expulsion of Ethiopian peacekeeping forces was also threatened.
Competing interests in the Horn
In light of these developments, Türkiye, with its deep-rooted interests in Somalia, has taken a clear stance, publicly supporting its territorial claims.
For over a decade, Türkiye has been a crucial ally, supporting Somalia’s defense infrastructure through training and arming its forces. The ongoing dispute appears to have galvanized Somalia into signing a defense and economic cooperation agreement with Türkiye in February. The pact includes Turkish assistance in safeguarding Somalia’s extensive coastline, including Somaliland, and rebuilding the Somali navy.
The brewing conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia has set off alarm bells across the Horn of Africa. Regional and international bodies, including the African Union, have voiced apprehensions about the potential fallout. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been working to mediate, though success remains elusive.
The geopolitical stakes are high. The dispute threatens to draw in Middle Eastern powers, which have long been entangled in the region’s complex political landscape. A conflict could also trigger new alliances and rivalries, reshaping the regional order.
Türkiye’s strategic investments in Somalia are substantial, encompassing education, healthcare, infrastructure, and military aid. The first and largest overseas Turkish military base, established in Mogadishu in 2017, underscores Türkiye’s commitment to Somali stability.
Yet, Türkiye also maintains favorable relations with Ethiopia, adding another layer of complexity to its diplomatic balancing act. Further complicating matters are Türkiye’s strained relations with Egypt, a regional heavyweight with its own vested interests.
In a period marked by evolving alliances, Ethiopia and Türkiye have maintained a cordial relationship, buoyed by significant Turkish investment. However, this bond is more economic than strategic.
On the broader geopolitical stage, the Middle East is divided into two primary camps: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE versus Türkiye, Iran, and Qatar. These rivalries have played out in proxy wars across Yemen, Syria, Libya, and beyond.
Nevertheless, the regional dispute has begun to thaw.
Last year, Saudi Arabia and Iran signed a peace agreement brokered by China, and the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas has unexpectedly brought Türkiye and Egypt closer. Recent agreements to reset their relations indicate a budding cooperation. Consequently, Ethiopia’s strategic importance to Türkiye may be diminishing.
Amid the Ethiopia-Somalia dispute, Türkiye is likely to side with Somalia, given its strategic significance. The defense agreement between the two strengthens this alignment, obliging Türkiye to support Somalia when needed.
Egypt, embroiled in a bitter dispute with Ethiopia over the GERD, is also poised to support Somalia. After Ethiopia’s deal with Somaliland, Egyptian President el-Sisi affirmed Egypt’s support for Somalia, vowing to prevent Ethiopian perceived threats to Somali territory.
Adding UAE to this geopolitical chessboard further complicates the matter.
The UAE has deep stakes in Somaliland, with its company DP World operating the Port of Berbera. Both the UAE and Somaliland envision Berbera as a major transit hub for the Horn of Africa, courting Ethiopia to utilize Berbera as its primary maritime outlet. This aligns with the UAE’s strategic interests and its leaders’ personal rapport with Ethiopian leadership. Consequently, Ethiopia, Somaliland, and UAE companies have entered into agreements to enhance infrastructure linking Ethiopia to Berbera.
Regionally, the UAE often finds itself at odds with Turkey and Egypt, as evidenced in Libya and Sudan. In Libya, the UAE backs the Libyan National Army led by KhalifaHaftar, while Turkey and Qatar support the opposing UN-recognized Government of National Accord. In Sudan, the UAE has reportedly supported the Rapid Support Forces, while Egypt backs Al Burhan. Consequently, in the event of an escalation in the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict, leading to regional realignments, the United Arab Emirates is likely to align itself with Ethiopia and Somaliland.
The stances of Eritrea, Sudan, and Djibouti remain less explicit.
Somalia has sought Eritrea’s support, given Eritrea’s role in training Somali soldiers. Despite recent strains in Ethiopia-Eritrea relations, Eritrea has not openly favored Somalia.
Djibouti, meanwhile, is in a prolonged dispute with the UAE, which lost control over Djibouti’s ports and has since been engaged in legal battles. The rising importance of Berbera port also threatens Djibouti’s logistical dominance.
The Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU has intensified security cooperation, with Ethiopia training 8,000 Somaliland soldiers. This development could further impact Ethiopia-Somalia relations and heighten tensions between Mogadishu and Hargeisa, particularly given ongoing border conflicts.
Recent clashes in Las Anod between Somaliland forces and the Khaatumo State, which seeks to join Somalia, have displaced tens of thousands and resulted in hundreds of deaths. This conflict has alsostrained Ethiopia’s ties with Djibouti and escalates tensions between Djibouti and Somaliland.
The closure of Somaliland’s diplomatic mission in Djibouti in June and mutual accusations of destabilization further illustrate the fracturing relations. Djibouti’s reported support for separatist militias in Somaliland’s Awdal region and its engagement with the leader of the Khatumo State underscore the volatile dynamics at play.
Ethiopia-Somaliland Pact: New Fault Lines in the Horn
The Horn of Africa is facing significant geopolitical challenges due to the ongoing dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia. This conflict has the potential to reshape regional alliances and partnerships, with far-reaching implications for the stability and cooperation within the region. The forthcoming round of negotiations in Ankara will be pivotal. A failure to reach a resolution could not only tarnish Türkiye’s diplomatic standing but also sour its relations with Ethiopia, potentially pushing Türkiye to align more closely with Somalia.
Ismail Osman, a security expert and former deputy director of Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), expressed ‘cautious optimism’ about the ongoing Türkiye-mediated talks. He noted that these discussions have opened a crucial dialogue channel, with both parties agreeing to reconvene in September.
However, Osman emphasized the difficulty of reaching a compromise, highlighting that Somalia is unlikely to engage in direct talks with Ethiopia unless it renounces its deal with Somaliland.
Osman underscored Ethiopia’s enduring quest for sea access, a strategic necessity for PMAbiy. If the talks collapse, the repercussions could be severe, leading to heightened regional instability and possibly armed conflict, Osman claims. He believes a prolonged dispute could undermine counterterrorism efforts and economic cooperation across the region.
The involvement of Middle Eastern countries, particularly the UAE, adds another layer of complexity, according to Osman. The UAE has invested heavily in both Ethiopian and Somaliland ports, driven by its ambitions to expand influence in the Horn. Osman emphasized that the region has become a stage for competing Middle Eastern interests. These rivalries, he says, intensify the situation, as each power seeks to protect its interests and extend its reach.
While the MoU with Somaliland could offer economic benefits to Ethiopia by boosting trade, reducing reliance on Djibouti’s ports, and cutting import/export costs, the expert warns that the diplomatic risks are significant. He cautions that the deal could isolate Ethiopia if the international community continues to uphold Somalia’s territorial integrity, complicating Ethiopia’s regional and global standing.
However, the U.S. election could also significantly impact the Somaliland issue. Project 2025, prepared by the Heritage Foundation as a blueprint for a potential Republican administration, advocates for U.S. recognition of Somaliland. It argues that acknowledging Somaliland statehood could counterbalance the U.S.’s waning influence in Djibouti
The Horn of Africa remains a geopolitical arena where evolving alliances and rivalries play out, with regional and international powers vying for influence. The next round of negotiations in September offers a glimmer of hope for a peaceful resolution. But with both nations holding firm, the specter of conflict looms large, threatening to embroil the region in a broader geopolitical struggle.
