Although the world might perceive the ceasefire in northern Ethiopia as a sign of peace in the country, ongoing unrest elsewhere suggests the contrary. Underlying tensions persist, and analysts warn of another major conflict brewing.
The tensions simmer both in and between a number of regional states, including between Somali and Afar, Somali and Oromia, Oromia and Amhara, and Amhara and Tigray. Gambella faces similar problems, as do the residents of Benishangul-Gumuz.
While no large-scale conflicts have erupted since the northern war ended in late 2022, these tensions pose a serious threat to the country’s stability and enduring peace.
The nation of over 120 million is grappling with crippling insecurity, and the prospect of a lasting peace is growing more distant. Only 12 countries, including neighboring Sudan, Somalia, and South Sudan, rank lower than Ethiopia on the 2023 Global Peace Index published by the Institute of Economics and Peace. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen are among the names near the bottom of the 163-country list.
Yet the number of casualties and fatalities caused over the last few years by armed conflict in Ethiopia surpasses even those of Ukraine and Gaza, the former of which also ranks lower on the Peace Index.
Ethiopia’s regional states are now highly militarized, particularly Oromia, Amhara, and Tigray. This includes both the bolstering of regional Special Forces and the arming of civilian populations. The ensuing violence seems to be growing worse with each passing day.
The instability has spread beyond remote areas, erupting in major cities and towns across Ethiopia. A gunfight two weeks ago in the vicinity of Addis Ababa’s Bole International Airport, a heavily secured area, illustrated just how precarious things have become.
The federal government was quick to downplay the incident as an inevitable consequence of its ambitious reform policies. A senior advisor to the Prime Minister even compared it to “an unpleasant smell when opening a long-abandoned house.” Security analysts, however, sharply criticize this narrative.
For Adem Kassie (PhD), researcher on security matters and a vice president of African Network of Institutional Lawyers, the government narrative is ‘ insensitive and simplistic.’
Farther north, friction between the Amhara and Tigray regions, home to two ethnic groups with a long history of shared culture and values, is threatening to spill over into a fresh bout of armed conflict.
A US intelligence report published in February noted the role disputed territories play in Ethiopia’s “potential intrastate turmoil.” Most pressing among these disputed territories is the area colloquially known as Wolqait.
Why Wolqait?
The name ‘Wolqait’ can be misleading as it is typically used to identify a large area in the northwestern corner of Ethiopia that includes the territories of Wolqait, Tsegede, Telemt, and Setit Humera on the Sudanese border. Wolqait alone covers an area of close to 3,400 square kilometers (over 1,300 square miles).
An expert on the area, speaking anonymously to The Reporter Magazine, emphasized that the disputed area is much larger than most people realize. Encompassing a total of about 20,000 square kilometers, the expert noted, “It nearly equals the size of some countries.”
The area remains highly sensitive not only in the relations between the two regional states but also for the nation at large and some of its neighbors.
The area sits at the heart of a tense territorial dispute between Tigray and Amhara.
For TPLF officials, control of Wolqait is a matter of life and death. The Amhara political elite also consider the area to be of great importance, attaching symbolic weight to it within the broader fight for rights. This deep significance on both sides makes reaching a lasting agreement difficult.
A lot has taken place in the area and many have died over the tussle, particularly since the end of the 1980s.
Amhara narratives describe horrific atrocities, including ethnic cleansing and mass graves, following the rise to power of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1991.
Many accuse the EPRDF government led by the TPLF of carrying out a demographic engineering program in the area in the 1990s. Proponents allege the TPLF used the strategy to strengthen Tigray’s claims to the territory, potentially justifying a favorable outcome in a future referendum.
Some institutions support this argument.
The University of Gondar a few years ago claimed to have found evidence of demographic engineering and the presence of mass graves in Wolqait.
Researchers Wosenyelew Tedla and Moges Kelklie have also addressed the issue of mass graves in Wolqait. Their work highlights the discovery of unmarked graves and suggests a connection to those who resisted.
“Mass graves of those who stood up for their rights and identity have been surfacing on a regular basis. The reason for such cruel and inhumane measures was the need to buttress the Tigrayan claim of long-time residence in the area,” reads the paper.
The researchers allege that demographic engineering efforts in the 1990s displaced at least 50,000 people from Wolqait, forcing them to flee internally or abroad. They further claim hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans were resettled in the region during this period. Wolqait’s strategic location coupled with its fertile land make it a highly valuable territory. There has never been agreement on related narrative between the two. This combination of factors contributes to the ongoing tensions between Amhara and Tigray.
The Tigray leadership argues the Ethiopian constitution should guide the resolution of the Wolqait dispute, referencing the territory’s status before the war. In contrast, Amhara leaders emphasize historical rights to the region, predating the TPLF’s rise to power, and seek to address alleged injustices, including accusations of demographic engineering, committed by the TPLF during its time in government.
Possible options on the table despite a varied level of popularity include a self-administering region, joint administration by Tigray and Amhara, special federal administration, and a referendum. Currently, there appears to be little willingness to compromise on either side. Both Tigray and Amhara leaders maintain strong positions regarding their claims to the territory.
Wolqait has enjoyed relative calm in recent years compared to other areas affected by the conflict. However, this peace is an armed peace.
Approaches toward the Pretoria agreement
The Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) signed on November 2, 2022, between the federal government and TPLF has been met with differing views from Tigray and Amhara political leaders. While Tigray leaders see it as a flawed but crucial step towards peace, Amhara leaders view it as superficial and ineffective. Tigrayan elites advocate for full implementation, while Amhara elites are skeptical due to their exclusion from the negotiations despite their stake in the outcome.
Three months ago, a consulting firm organized a debate on the significance of the signing and implementation of the Pretoria agreement to ensure durable peace in the country. Representatives presented contrasting viewpoints: Abebe Gebrehiwot, a former deputy president of Tigray’s interim administration, and Tewodros Hailemariam, a historian and former senior member of the Amhara National Movement (NaMA), offered their perspectives on the agreement’s significance
Abebe noted the Pretoria agreement was a crucial step in ending hostilities and argued the deal had not yet secured lasting peace due to incomplete implementation.
Tewodros warned that a meaningful peace is not feasible without addressing Amhara interests.
The audience present at the debate initially reflected a lack of complete understanding. At the beginning, 22 attendees agreed with Abebe’s view that the agreement played a key role in peace, while only six disagreed. The remainder expressed uncertainty and sought further clarification. However, by the debate’s conclusion, the perception had shifted. Now, 32 participants believed the agreement would not have a significant impact, while the initial 22 supporters still argued for its importance.
Despite the small sample size, the shift offers valuable insights. It at least underscores the importance of conducting more rigorous studies in the future.
Common ground for a win-win solution
Officials of the Tigray interim administration estimate there are 1.2 million people displaced from their homes in Wolqait and have made repeated calls for their safe return. However, officials on the Amhara side strongly dispute the figure and accuse their counterparts in Mekelle of exaggerating the numbers for international sympathy.
Amhara regional authorities have also expressed support for the return of IDPs. However, disagreements persist regarding the process. Tigray leaders have made their approval conditional on the IDPs returning under the pre-war Tigray administration. This effectively links the return of IDPs to the broader issue of restoring Tigray’s pre-war administrative boundaries, complicating the situation.
A paper titled “Towards a Meaningful Peace for Tigray,” was recently published. The paper was well by Getachew Reda, the current president of the Tigray interim administration. Authored by Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, a former senior TPLF official now affiliated with the World Peace Foundation, the paper prioritizes the restoration of Tigray’s pre-war administrative boundaries. He presents the restoration of Tigray’s pre-war ‘administrative boundary’ essential before IDPs return.
“The critical path in implementing the Pretoria Agreement is the return of Tigray to its prewar administrative boundary. Once the full administrative boundary of Tigray is under the control of the Interim administration, it will open room for the return of IDPs into their places of origin,” he stated.
The idea is not welcomed by the Amhara leaders. They require IDPs to return under Amhara administration in the disputed Wolqait area, which they claim belongs to the Amhara region. Additionally, they exclude those accused of serious crimes, like the massacre in MaiKadra.
Colonel Demeke Zewdu is the deputy head of that particular zone and he leads the security division. He is an influential figure in the Amhara push for Wolqait.
“People of Tigray who concede that Wolqait belongs to Amhara are welcome,” he said. “But those who deny it cannot live with us.”
What is going on in disputed areas?
There are reports of increased tensions in the region, with locals indicating the arrival of federal troops. Additionally, there are concerns about potential military mobilization by other parties.
The federal government has announced plans to withdraw “non-federal” forces from the area. This was confirmed in an interview with the Defense Minister as well as by the Prime Minister during a public engagement with representatives from the Tigray region. Both officials pledged to work towards the withdrawal of these forces.
Analysts are divided on the prospects for dialogue between Tigray and Amhara leaders. Some believe worsening conditions could push both sides to the negotiating table to address common threats. Others fear rising tensions could lead to renewed conflict.
There have been recent reports of Tigrayan forces entering Raya, a disputed area previously under Tigrayan control during the TPLF’s leadership of the federal government. This development led to the dismantling of the Amhara administration in the area, with some officials reportedly killed.
Tigray officials indicated that the move was made due to a green light from the federal government. Tadesse Worede (Leut.Gen), deputy president of the Tigray Intrim Administration announced in a televised press briefing that an agreement has been reached with the federal government on several key issues. These include the withdrawal of Amhara forces, dismantling of Amhara-administered structures, disbandment or withdrawal of Amhara police, removal of Amhara political symbols, and the departure of ‘non-resident’ civil servants from the area.
Those details have been put into practice since the entry of Tigray forces to the area. The recent entry of Tigray forces into the area has displaced residents. A report by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) released on April 17, 2024, indicates that roughly 50,000 civilians have been displaced in the last couple of weeks.
These actions are seen as a major hurdle to fostering healthy dialogue between Amhara and Tigray leaders, risk reopening old wounds and jeopardizing the ability of different ethnic groups to coexist peacefully.
The Tigray forces’ move incited a swift response across the Amhara region. Regional authorities from the Prosperity Party (PP), the once strong opposition National Movement of Amhara (NaMA), and the Fano– a popular force in open conflict with the government – all strongly condemned the action and called for the public to defend themselves.
Meanwhile, public processions in Tigray have called for the return of IDPs. Those processions included voices that claimed that residents of the disputed areas ‘have never expressed identity-related concerns’. Amhara political leaders warn that denying the reality hinders productive discussions and deepens mistrust.
The question remains: Will the US intelligence report on the disputed areas be a reliable predictor of the future? Or will optimists prevail, and the two regions forge an alliance or at least avoid further conflict?
