Ethiopian foreign policy has long been characterized by its non-aligned stance and minimal intervention, with the principle of non-interference guiding Addis Ababa’s international relations approach for a long time. Recent actions on the part of the current administration, however, have come to be viewed by some as heralding a significant shift in Ethiopian foreign policy.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) has been vocal for some time about his government’s desire to regain access to the sea. Though the aspiration is not new for Ethiopia, which had a coastline until Eritrea gained independence in 1991, the current administration’s approach has raised regional tensions, particularly after signing a controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland in January 2024.
Despite the initial hubbub and gestures towards implementation, which would see Ethiopia lease a stretch of the Somaliland coastline in exchange for sovereign recognition of the breakaway territory, the deal appears to have stalled. Months have passed with little sign of progress and government propaganda surrounding the agreement has died down.
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But this does not necessarily mean the administration has abandoned its pursuit of sea access.
“We want to be a superpower in regional power politics,” Zadig Abraha, director of the African Leadership Excellence Academy and a member of the Prosperity Party, said during a recent interview with a party-affiliate television station.
It is an idea reflected in a book published by the Ethiopian Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA) last month. Titled “The Grand Strategy of the Two Waters,” the work reflects on Ethiopia’s interests in the Red Sea and the Nile, and the historical, legal, and geopolitical facets of these interests.
It concludes that Ethiopia’s fate has been and continues to be linked inextricably to the two water bodies.
The book quotes Mesfin Woldemariam (Prof.) on the need to ‘control’ the Nile.
The power that controlled Ethiopia controlled the Nile Valley including the Sudan and Egypt; the power that controlled the Nile Valley and Egypt controlled the Suez Canal; and the power that controlled the Suez Canal controlled the world, it reads.
It examines the geopolitical extension of the politics surrounding the two waters and further advocates for Ethiopia to stand against long-standing imposition of ‘hydro imperialism’ and what it terms a “containment strategy” implemented by foreign actors to isolate Ethiopia from both of the geostrategic water bodies.
Despite the institutionalization of hydropolitics, the book underlines the importance of building internal strength. Peace, stability and economic prosperity are highlighted as crucial. It further attributed creating economic integration, dialogue, and cooperation with neighboring countries as being equally important.
The book expounds on the need to build naval bases and strengthen naval forces, and notes creating public consciousness in marine and hydropolitics as key steps in the strategy. It boldly states Ethiopia’s readiness to defend its right to access and use both waters in an era marked by increasingly contentious rivalries over control of geostrategic positions across the globe.
Dareskedar Taye (PhD), one of the book’s authors and a senior research fellow at IFA, observes both the Nile and the Red Sea present equal levels of opportunity and threat to Ethiopia.
In an exclusive interview with The Ethiopian Reporter [Amharic], he argued the push to isolate Ethiopia from the Red Sea has historically come from lower Nile Basin countries.
“Ethiopia can’t remain silent. It always has political, economic and security interests in its waters. If Ethiopia wants to prosper further, it has to project power. With all its risks, Ethiopia should opt for an anti-status quo move to secure its interests. If anyone thinks the agreement with Somaliland was simply to have access to port service then they would be mistaken. We were able to secure the 19 percent stake in Berbera Port long ago. The recent deal with Somaliland was rather signed in accordance with our interest to become one of key actors in the region,” said Dareskedar.
Although he described Ethiopia as a “Red Sea littoral state,” the co-author underscored the imperative for the country to strengthen its naval power and defensive preparedness.
“The likelihood that Ethiopia will face threats from abroad on the Red Sea will be on the rise. It is strategically important to strengthen defensive might in the region. The MoU will be crucial to secure the sea corridor to build a naval base in order for the country to play its own role in regional peace and stability and also for its power projection in the region,” said Dareskedar.
Other scholars and experts share the idea that Ethiopia should respond to the changing geopolitical realities in the Horn of Africa and wider Red Sea regions. They argue Ethiopia cannot remain silent in a region where numerous foreign powers race to secure naval bases and military installations.
A 2019 report from the Institute of Security Studies revealed at least 13 countries have military presence in Africa, out of which, 11 countries have bases in the Horn of Africa. The race to deploy military power in the region is thought to have intensified in the five years since the report was published.
Attacks launched by Yemeni Houthi forces on commercial vessels crossing Bab Al-Mandab are a recent testament to the growing possibility of a rapid escalation in foreign military engagement looming over the region.
Some analysts argue Ethiopia’s recent moves are a new way to project power in the contentious region, particularly in light of wider shifts. They believe this could signal a shift in Ethiopian diplomacy, leaving behind the traditional head-down, conservative, and predictable style for a more pragmatic approach to foreign relations.
A study by Federico Donelli & Brendon Cannon published in 2023 titled “Power projection of Middle East states in the Horn of Africa” provides a more realistic concept of what is going on in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region.
“Various Middle East states have taken unprecedented military and quasi-military actions in their near abroad in recent years. The spread of military base building, ports development and influence seeking in the Horn of Africa by states such as Turkey and the UAE offer prime examples. Indeed, these countries may be said to be increasingly enmeshed in the politics and security of states such as Somalia and Sudan,” reads the study.
“The actions of these Middle Eastern states across the Horn of Africa have reportedly facilitated geopolitical tensions and regional rivalries that risk militarizing the region. The impact of their rivalries in Africa is becoming increasingly damaging. Their zero-sum rivalry has provoked retaliations, which have dangerously destabilized vulnerable parts of Africa. New tensions are also arising,” it summarizes.
In his in-depth look at regional geopolitics, Belete Belachew (PhD) argues the “push to isolate Ethiopia from the shores of the Red Sea” is mainly the result of a “grand strategy of making the Red Sea and Arab sea.”
Belete sees the Red Sea contest as a continuation of global superpower contention in the Indo-China and Pacific regions.
The Gulf’s race for Red Sea supremacy has picked up pace as conflict centered around Qatar, which had led to divisions among Gulf States, settles down. The new status quo sees the UAE and Saudi Arabia engaged in a rivalry, with their engagements in Eritrea, Sudan, and Ethiopia undergoing a complete transformation.
When war began in Sudan last April, the two oil-rich nations were quick to provide support to either side of the bloody conflict. Saudi, Egypt, and other allied Arab states have positioned themselves behind the Sudanese military, while the UAE and its allies are backing the paramilitary group on the other side of the war.
With its ownership of the strategically important Suez Canal, its influential role in the Arab League, and proximity to mediate Israel-Palestine conflict, Egypt is still the dominant power in the Red Sea region. That dominance was only strengthened by the construction of the 630,000 square meter Berenice military base southeast of Aswan.
Inaugurated in 2020, Berenice houses both naval and air forces in addition to a wide range of services. The new base augments Egypt’s ability to secure international navigation routes from Bab Al-Mandab to Port Said.
Belete observes Qatar, Iran and Turkey have continued to be decisive forces in the Red Sea, and stresses the need to pay attention to Israel’s role in the region.
Many observers raise concerns over the growing foreign military presence in the Horn, as the region welcomes everyone from the mightiest nuclear powers to less conspicuous players, all scrambling to secure military installations and forge defense alliances. The provision of defense training and assistance thus pours into the Horn states.
Critics say Turkey’s latest military and economic agreement with Somalia is a testament to the increasing power projection of foreign actors into the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region. Turkey is quickly becoming a decisive political actor in Somalia.
Belete notes the development of ports and trade zones, including administrative cooperation, are also key economic means of securing influence in the region. The UAE (the Little Spartans) has used it as its trademark move from Eritrea to Tanzania. On the other side, Saudi Arabia is interested in forming a regional circle that best serves its influence in the region.
Throughout human history, countries have exerted power to boost their supremacy and expand their presence. This reality was manifested in the form of arms races, expanding military alliances, and military base construction following the Second World War. When the Cold War era ended, there was hope of putting an end to military intervention and arms races.
However, the hopes proved futile as global trends show an increase in power projection. Although Joseph Nye’s popular idea of soft power has proved effective, building military muscle still defines power relations in the 21st century.
The US, with an estimated 250,000 military personnel deployed across close to 800 bases, leads the world in military presence globally. This includes 4,000 personnel at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti.
The multi-polar world order of the day has paved the way for many countries to join the race for expanding military footprints in various regions, with even China and its non-interference policy unable to resist.
China operates a large military base in Djibouti and has recently dispatched a military vessel carrying 700 personnel to the Red Sea.
The new book from the Ethiopian Institute of Foreign Affairs echoes Paul Collier’s argument in ‘The Bottom Billions’:
“If you are coastal you serve the world, if you are landlocked you serve your neighbors”.”
The book emphasizes the need for Ethiopian sea access and suggests a more assertive foreign policy to achieve it. This implies the administration’s stance to go on exploring alternative options as the Somaliland deal sputters.
